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THE PERIPATETIC NATURE OF EU 
CORPORATE TAX LAW 
CHRISTIANA HJI PANAYI 
This article examines some aspects of the European Union’s corporate tax 
set-up which correspond to aspects of a country’s corporate tax regime. The 
overarching question is whether there is such a thing as EU corporate tax 
law. This article seeks to address this in the context of the following issues: 
the existence of a uniform tax base and tax rates; the existence of anti-abuse 
rules and a transfer pricing regime; and, finally, the existence of a common 
tax administration and its powers. The article questions whether the 
peripatetic development of EU corporate tax law is suitable for the EU or 
whether it undermines its long-term objectives. The potential impact of Brexit 
in the development of EU corporate tax law is also addressed. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Although there have been rapid developments and dense harmonisation in some 
areas of European Union (‘EU’) law, in other areas progress has been rather 
limited. Taxation, and especially corporate taxation, is one such area. There are 
a number of reasons why the development of EU tax law has not kept pace with 
other areas of law, the most important of them being the lack of Union 
competence in direct tax matters and, as a corollary, the fiscal veto enjoyed by 
all Member States. Under the principle of attribution of powers,1 a cornerstone 
of the European legal structure, the Union and its institutions enjoy competence 
only in the areas of law assigned to or conferred on them under EU treaties. 
This principle of attribution of powers must be respected both internally and in 
the Union’s external sphere of affairs. Therefore, every act must be based on a 
general or specific treaty provision (the legal basis) empowering the Union, 
expressly or impliedly, to act.  
                                                 
 Chair in Tax Law, Queen Mary University of London. The author would like to thank Dr 
Michael Blackwell for comments on an earlier draft. The contents of this article are based on 
materials available up to 25 July 2019. 
1 Treaty on European Union, opened for signature 7 February 1992 [2009] OJ C 115/13 (entered 
into force 1 November 1993) (‘TEU’) art 5.  
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All EU treaties have been silent on direct taxation. While the treaties have dealt 
with indirect taxes to some extent2 they have made no reference to direct taxes. 
This being the case, there is no explicit legislative base for the harmonisation 
of direct taxes, and Member States are considered to have retained complete 
competence in this area. General (proxy) legislative bases under articles 115 
and 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) have 
been used for direct tax legislation. These legislative bases focus on the 
attainment of the internal market3 and their use is strictly policed by the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’). The few corporate tax directives in 
this area were proposed (and approved by Member States in Council) on the 
basis of these legislative bases.4  
Therefore, the EU corporate tax legislative process is actually quite simple. 
Corporate tax legislative proposals are invariably drafted as directives by the 
European Commission, most often on the basis of article 115 of the TFEU, that 
is, on the principle that the measures are needed for the establishment or proper 
functioning of the internal market. For such proposals to become EU secondary 
legislation, unanimity in Council is required. In other words, all Member States 
(in Council) have to unanimously agree to the legislative proposals. The 
European Parliament has no official involvement in the enactment of tax 
legislation. Whilst it may be consulted or it may offer its views on a matter 
without necessarily being asked, its role is largely advisory. 
This so-called ‘fiscal veto’ — the power of even one Member State to veto a 
harmonising measure in direct tax law — has played a decisive role in the 
development of EU corporate tax law. The fiscal veto that Member States enjoy 
is a fiercely guarded prerogative which has survived successive treaty 
amendments and attempts to move to qualified majority voting.5 However, the 
                                                 
2 See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, opened for signature 7 February 1992, 
[2009] OJ C 115/199 (entered into force 1 November 1993) (‘TFEU’) art 28 which provides 
for a Union based upon a customs union. See TFEU arts 30 and 110, which led to the 
harmonisation of excise duties. See Ben JM Terra and Peter J Wattel, European Tax Law 
(Kluwer Law International, 6th ed, 2012) ch 5. 
3 See Claudio M Radaelli and Ulrike S Kraemer, ‘Governance Areas in EU Direct Tax Policy’ 
(2008) 46(2) Journal of Common Market Studies 315, 316. 
4 For a review of the corporate tax directives, see Christiana HJI Panayi, ‘European Tax Law: 
Legislation and Soft Law’ in Carsten Gerner-Beuerle et al (eds), Gore-Browne on EU Company 
Law (Jordan Publishing, 1991 updated) ch 18 (‘European Tax Law’). Also see Christiana HJI 
Panayi, European Union Corporate Tax Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013) ch 2 (‘EU 
Corporate Tax Law’). 
5 See, for example, the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Constitutional Treaty) 
which provided for qualified majority voting for measures on company taxation when the 
Council unanimously found that these measures related to administrative cooperation or 
combated tax fraud and tax evasion. See proposed art III-63. This treaty was never ratified. See 
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EU’s lack of competence combined with the fiscal veto means that the 
regulation of direct taxes is effectively at the discretion of Member States. For 
this reason, the adoption of a uniform fiscal policy or a uniform corporate tax 
policy has proved impossible. So far, Member States have shown divergent 
approaches to, and appetites for, tax harmonisation in general and corporate tax 
harmonisation in particular. This is evident from the protracted negotiations 
that often take place for the adoption of, or amendments to, a directive, as with 
the proposals to introduce the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base or 
the Financial Transaction Tax. Both of these proposals are considered below. 
It should also be noted that international direct taxation in general is not as 
regulated as other areas such as trade or investment. When the European 
Economic Community (‘EEC’) was created in the mid-1950s, the regulation of 
direct taxes was not seen as a priority; nor was it seen as an option, for that 
matter, due to the EEC’s lack of competence. The main priority was the removal 
of the distortions caused by trade barriers; hence, the concentration on the 
harmonisation of indirect taxes. Today, the EU has a fairly harmonised system 
of Value Added Tax (‘VAT’): a general and broadly based consumption tax 
assessed on the value added to goods and services. Under the EU’s VAT 
system, the framework rules are uniform but the rates are largely left to Member 
States, subject to certain minimum rates.6 Even though the VAT system is 
considered to be harmonised, it is the Member States that collect this tax and 
not the EU institutions.7 Customs8 and excises9 are also broadly harmonised in 
the EU and are administered in a similar way. 
                                                 
European Parliament, ‘Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (not ratified)’ (18 
June 2004) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/in-the-past/the-parliament-
and-the-treaties/draft-treaty-establishing-a-constitution-for-europe>. 
6 The minimum standard VAT rate is 15% and the reduced rate is 5%. There are exceptions to 
the rules with special rates of VAT. Also, there are rules for goods and services that are exempt 
from VAT and those that are subject to 0% VAT. For a thorough analysis of the rules, see Ben 
Terra and Julie Kajus, A Guide to the European VAT Directives 2016 (IBFD, 2016). 
7 As explained below (n 17), a percentage of the VAT collected is contributed to the EU. 
8 For information on the Union Customs Code, see ‘Union Customs Code’, European 
Commission (Web Page, 11 June 2019) <https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/ 
business/union-customs-code_en>. See also Timothy Lyons, EU Customs Law (Oxford 
University Press, 3rd ed, 2018). 
9 For information on the common EU provisions which apply to all products subject to excise 
duty see Council Directive 2008/118/EC of 16 December 2008 concerning the General 
Arrangements for Excise Duty and Repealing Directive 92/12/EEC [2008] OJ L 9/12. See also 
‘Common Excise Duty Provisions’, European Commission (Web Page, 11 June 2019) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/excise-duties-alcohol-tobacco-energy/ 
general-overview/common-provisions_en>.  
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The same cannot be said of direct taxation and especially corporate taxation. It 
is still the case today that, in principle, every country has jurisdiction to tax in 
any way it sees fit. Whilst there are some model tax treaties, such as the OECD 
Model Tax Convention10 or the UN Model Tax Convention11 which suggest 
ways of allocating tax jurisdiction between the source country and the 
taxpayer’s country of residence, these models are not binding on countries,12 
nor are they set in stone. In fact, these models are regularly updated in the light 
of new developments. Certainly, there are some pragmatic limitations affecting 
the tax sovereignty of countries as far as the imposition of extra-territorial 
taxation is concerned, these mostly being limitations on enforceability and 
those arising from customary international law.13 However, the regulation of 
their direct tax affairs, and especially the design and implementation of their 
corporate tax systems, is very much at the discretion of Member States.  
It should be pointed out that, technically, the EU does not directly receive any 
yields collected under the corporate tax systems of Member States. The EU’s 
revenue is derived from its so-called ‘own resources’ system,14 which includes 
customs duties on imports from outside the EU and sugar levies,15 a small 
percentage of the harmonised VAT base of each Member State,16 as well as 
other sources of revenue.17 The largest source of own resource is, however, 
                                                 
10 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, 21 November 2017 (‘OECD Model 
Tax Convention’). 
11 United Nations, United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and 
Developing Countries (2017) <https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/MDT 
_2017.pdf>.   
12 Some countries, such as the USA, have their own models. The US Model was updated last in 
2016: US Treasury, United States Model Income Tax Convention (17 February 2016) 
<https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-US%20 
Model-2016.pdf>. 
13 See Christiana HJI Panayi, Double Taxation, Tax Treaties, Treaty Shopping and the European 
Community (Kluwer Law, 2005) chs 1–2; Lynne Oats, Angharad Miller and Emer Mulligan, 
Principles of International Taxation (Bloomsbury, 2017) chs 5–7; Kevin Holmes, International 
Tax Policy and Double Tax Treaties (IBFD, 2014) ch 2.  
14 See Council Decision of 26 May 2014 on the System of Own Resources of the European Union 
(2014/335/EU) [2014] OJ L 168/105 (‘Own Resources Decision’). 
15 EU governments keep 20% of the amounts as collection cost. See ibid art 2(1)(a) (on traditional 
own resources) and art 2(3). 
16 This is own resources based on value added tax: ibid art 2(1)(b). The uniform rate is fixed at 
0.30 % (art 2(4)) but the VAT base to be taxed is capped at 50% of the gross national income 
for each country. This rule is intended to prevent less prosperous countries having to pay a 
disproportionate amount. 
17 Other sources of revenue include tax and other deductions from EU staff remunerations, bank 
interest, contributions from non-EU countries to certain programmes, interest on late payments 
and fines.  
2019 EU CORPORATE TAX LAW 5 
based on gross national income; each Member State transfers a percentage of 
its gross national income to the EU.18 Member States’ contributions are not 
fixed and depend on what is needed to finance the balance of total expenditure 
not covered by the other own resources. Therefore, on a yearly basis, and 
depending on the financing needs of the EU, part of the corporate taxes 
collected by a Member State goes to the EU not because the EU has direct 
authority to levy corporate taxes but because they form part of the gross national 
income of that Member State from which a contribution must be made.   
Notwithstanding this, the EU’s involvement in the development of corporate 
tax law — at least historically19 — was not aimed at helping (or forcing) 
Member States to increase their corporate tax yields and, as a corollary, their 
contributions to the EU. Rather, the emphasis was on the impact of domestic 
corporate tax rules on the internal market and, more specifically, on the 
enjoyment of the various fundamental freedoms enshrined in the EU Treaties. 
The European Commission has long recognised that taxation has a significant 
role to play if the EU is to become the most competitive economy in the world.20 
Indeed, up until 2012, the focus of attention of the European Commission was 
on removing tax obstacles to cross-border movement, as this would improve 
market access, increase competition, spur investment and innovation, and 
enhance the competitiveness of the EU. Since 2012, a period which broadly 
coincides with the launch of the OECD/G20 initiative to curb base erosion and 
profit splitting,21 the focus of attention seems to have shifted to dealing with 
aggressive tax planning and avoidance without, however, abandoning ongoing 
efforts to remove corporate tax obstacles in a more holistic way, as is shown 
below. 
Broadly, what could currently be considered as the corporate tax legislation of 
the European Union is a patchwork of minimum rules (enacted through 
directives) which try to address some of the distortions caused by the co-
existence of different and largely unharmonised corporate tax systems of 
Member States. The Merger Directive tries to deal with obstacles arising from 
                                                 
18 See Own Resources Decision (n 14) art 2(1)(c). Correction mechanisms are designed to correct 
excessive contribution by certain Member States: arts 4–5. 
19 See Christiana HJI Panayi, ‘The Early Proposals for a European Corporate Tax Policy’ in Peter 
Harris and Dominic de Cogan (eds), Studies in the History of Tax Law (Hart Publishing, 
forthcoming). 
20 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament: Implementation of the Community Lisbon Programme — The Contribution of 
Taxation and Customs Policies to the Lisbon Strategy COM(2005) 532, 25 October 2005. 
21 Christiana HJI Panayi, Advanced Issues in International and European Tax Law (Hart 
Publishing, 2015) ch 5 (‘Advanced Issues’). 
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certain types of cross-border mergers and reorganisations.22 The Parent-
Subsidiary Directive23 aims to alleviate double taxation arising from the cross-
border payment of profit distributions (usually dividends) between group 
companies, under certain conditions. The Interest and Royalties Directive does 
the same, vis-à-vis cross-border interest and royalty payments between group 
companies.24 There are also minimum rules which facilitate the cooperation of 
Member States in recovering taxes or exchanging information.25 In addition, 
there are now some minimum anti-avoidance rules which endeavour to provide 
a common approach to some frequently used anti-avoidance techniques.26 
There are also rules which help streamline tax dispute resolution involving two 
different competent authorities, as well as establishing mandatory arbitration.27 
This body of law is buttressed by the voluminous case law of the CJEU, which 
sets out how the general fundamental freedoms are to be interpreted in various 
(often complex) corporate tax scenarios.28 
This article seeks to address the overarching question: is there such a thing as 
EU corporate tax law? Its purpose is not to survey all of the legislative 
                                                 
22 Council Directive 2009/133/EC of 19 October 2009 on the Common System of Taxation 
Applicable to Mergers, Divisions, Partial Divisions, Transfers of Assets and Exchanges of 
Shares Concerning Companies of Different Member States and to the Transfer of the Registered 
Office of an SE or SCE between Member States (codified version) [2009] OJ L 310/34 (‘Merger 
Directive’). 
23 Council Directive 2011/96/EU of 30 November 2011 on the Common System of Taxation 
Applicable in the Case of Parent Companies and Subsidiaries of Different Member States 
[2011] OJ L 345/8 (‘Parent-Subsidiary Directive’). This has codified previous versions of the 
Directive: Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the Common System of Taxation 
Applicable in the Case of Parent Companies and Subsidiaries in Different Member States, 
amended by Council Directive 2003/123/EC of 22 December 2003 [2011] OJ L 345/8. 
24 Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a Common System of Taxation Applicable to 
Interest and Royalty Payments Made between Associated Companies of Different Member 
States OJ L 157/49, amended by Council Directive 2004/66/EC of 26 April 2004, Council 
Directive 2004/76/EC of 29 April 2004 and Council Directive 2006/98/EC of 20 November 
2006 (‘Interest and Royalties Directive’). 
25 See Council Directive 2010/24/EU of 16 March 2010 concerning Mutual Assistance for the 
Recovery of Claims Relating to Taxes, Duties and Other Measures) [2010] OJ L 84/1 (‘Mutual 
Assistance for the Recovery of Claims Directive’) and Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 
February 2011 on Administrative Cooperation in the Field of Taxation [2011] OJ L 64/1 
(‘DAC’).  
26 See Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 Laying Down Rules against Tax 
Avoidance Practices that Directly Affect the Functioning of the Internal Market [2016] OJ L 
193/1. 
27 Council Directive (EU) 2017/1852 of 10 October 2017 on Tax Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
in the European Union [2017] OJ L 265/1 (‘Tax Dispute Resolution Directive’). 
28 Christiana HJI Panayi, ‘European Community Tax Law and Companies: Principles of the 
European Court of Justice’ in Carsten Gerner-Beuerle et al (eds), Gore-Browne on EU 
Company Law (Jordan Publishing, 1991 updated) ch 19 (‘European Community Tax Law’). 
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instruments or case law relevant to the EU’s corporate tax law. Rather, the aim 
of this article is to determine whether a common corporate tax regime exists by 
reviewing some aspects of the EU’s corporate tax set-up which correspond to 
aspects of a country’s corporate tax regime in the context of the following 
issues: the existence of a uniform tax base and tax rates; the existence of anti-
abuse rules and a transfer pricing regime; and, finally, the existence of a 
common tax administration and its powers. The article questions whether the 
peripatetic development of EU corporate tax law is suitable for the EU or 
whether it undermines its long-term objectives. The potential impact of Brexit 
in the development of EU corporate tax law is also addressed in the final Part 
of this article. 
II AN EU CORPORATE TAX BASE AND TAX RATE? 
Broadly, a corporate tax base is the set of rules upon which the assessment or 
determination of corporate tax liability is based. In the European Union, there 
is no harmonised corporate tax base nor a common tax rate — at least not yet. 
However, there have been on-going efforts to create a common corporate tax 
base to facilitate cross-border corporate groups.  
In its ground-breaking 2001 study, Company Taxation in the Internal Market,29 
the European Commission recommended a single set of rules to calculate the 
taxable profits of companies in the EU. This study set the parameters for a very 
important proposal in the area of corporate tax law — the proposal for a 
common tax base and consolidation. As an alternative to targeted solutions, the 
possibility of adopting a comprehensive solution was examined. It was 
reiterated numerous times in the 2001 study30 that the existence of 15 tax 
systems (at the time) was the source of most of the tax obstacles to cross-border 
movement. Several comprehensive measures predicated on a single tax base 
were broadly considered by the European Commission, though it was noted that 
these approaches were not developed in detail. It was noted that ‘given that all 
Member States are committed to exploiting the opportunities of the Internal 
Market to the maximum, there is certainly a case for continuing and extending 
the research into these possibilities’.31  
Ever since the publication of the 2001 Company Tax Study, the European 
Commission had been working on a project for a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). On 16 March 2011, the European Commission 
                                                 
29 European Commission, Company Taxation in the Internal Market SEC(2001) 1681, 373. 
30 Ibid 2, 8, 14, 372. 
31 Ibid 419. 
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published the eagerly awaited first official proposal for the CCCTB.32 Broadly, 
the 2011 CCCTB proposal provided companies with establishments in at least 
two Member States with detailed optional rules to compute their group taxable 
income according to one set of rules, those of the new consolidated tax base, 
rather than according to the national tax bases of each Member State. The 
overall aim of the CCCTB was to reduce the costs of complying with 27 (at the 
time) tax regimes, to minimise tax arbitrage and to simplify restructurings. It 
was also aimed at providing comprehensive consolidation of profits and losses 
on an EU basis.33 In other words, the CCCTB was essentially proposed as a 28th 
system — all Member States would adopt it as an alternative to their existing 
corporate tax systems. The European Commission extolled the proposal for 
offering companies a ‘one-stop-shop’ system for filing their tax returns, as well 
as provide for consolidation. This would translate into savings in compliance 
time and costs.34 It was also claimed that the new system would bring tangible 
benefits for companies wishing to expand into other Member States.35 
Although the proposal was not immediately curbed on the basis of subsidiarity 
and enjoyed the support of the European Parliament, which in fact advocated 
for its mandatory application,36 not much happened thereafter. After years of 
technical discussions in Council, it was clear that some of the provisions of the 
original CCCTB proposal, and especially consolidation, were too ambitious to 
be adopted all at once. Several Member States and, in particular, the UK were 
opposed to this proposal, as they would lose much of their power to determine 
corporate tax policy. Smaller Member States were also concerned that 
formulary apportionment under this proposal would have the overall effect of 
                                                 
32 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) COM(2011), 121 final, 16 March 2011. 
33 See European Commission, ‘European Corporate Tax Base: Making Business Easier and 
Cheaper’ (Press Release, IP/11/319, 16 March 2011) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
11-319_en.htm>. 
34 The Commission estimated that the CCCTB would save businesses across the EU €700 million 
in reduced compliance costs, €1 billion in reduced costs to expand cross-border and €1.3 billion 
through consolidation. It was also estimated that businesses looking to expand cross-border 
would benefit from up to €1 billion in savings. See ibid. See also ‘Questions and Answers on 
the CCCTB’, European Commission (Memo, MEMO/11/171, 16 March 2011) 2 
(‘Memo/11/171’). 
35 Memo/11/171 (n 34) 5.  
36 See European Parliament legislative resolution of 19 April 2012 on the proposal for a Council 
directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) (COM(2011)0121 – C7-
0092/2011 – 2011/0058(CNS)). 
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shifting tax revenues to larger countries with larger markets such as France and 
Germany.37  
It was widely thought that discussions on the more controversial aspects of the 
proposal — notably, consolidation and formulary apportionment — were 
holding back progress on other less controversial but still important areas, 
which could be agreed more quickly. Furthermore, the 2011 CCCTB proposal 
was very much overshadowed by the high profile OECD/G20 Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting (‘BEPS’) initiative38 and the EU’s eager response to this 
initiative.39 Arguably, the 2011 CCCTB proposal had to be adjusted to be 
perceived as truly effective in tackling aggressive tax planning and not merely 
as a tool to reduce compliance costs for multinationals. 
With the appointment of Jean-Claude Juncker as President of the European 
Commission, interest in the CCCTB was reinvigorated. In October 2015, a 
consultation on the relaunch of the CCCTB was published40 and in the 2015 
Action Plan for a Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System41 the European 
Commission announced that it would relaunch the CCCTB the following year. 
This was to be done through a two-step approach: Member States would first 
                                                 
37 See Robert Cline et al, Study on the Economic and Budgetary Impact of the Introduction of a 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base in the European Union (Ernst & Young, 2011). 
The Study was commissioned by the Irish Department of Finance from Ernst & Young in 2010. 
See also Michael Devereux and Simon Loretz, The Effects of EU Formula Apportionment on 
Corporate Tax Revenues (Working Paper No 0706, Oxford University Centre for Business 
Taxation, 2007). 
38 BEPS refers to tax avoidance strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to 
artificially shift profits to low or no-tax locations. With the backing of G20 member countries, 
in 2013, the OECD published 15 Action items to address the main areas where it was felt that 
companies had been most aggressively accomplishing base erosion and profit shifting. See 
OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (2013) (‘BEPS Action Plan’) 
<http://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf>. The Final Reports on these action items 
contained several non-binding recommendations: OECD, ‘BEPS 2015 Final Reports’ (Web 
Page, 5 October 2015) <http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps-2015-final-reports.htm>. The OECD 
and G20 member countries made a political commitment to adopt the four minimum standards. 
The BEPS minimum standards are the following: (1) the prevention of harmful tax practices 
and through the automatic exchange of information on tax rulings (Action 5); (2) countering 
treaty shopping (Action 6); (3) country-by-country reporting (Action 13); and (4) improving 
dispute resolution (Action 14). 
39 HJI Panayi, Advanced Issues (n 21) chs 5–6. 
40 See ‘Consultation on the Re-launch of the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB)’ European Commission (Web Page) <http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/ 
common/consultations/tax/relaunch_ccctb_en.htm>.  
41 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council, ‘A Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 5 Key Areas 
for Action’ COM(2015)302 final, 17 June 2015 (‘A Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System’). 
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agree on rules for a common tax base, after which agreement would be reached 
on the consolidation element. Neither the original proposal published in 2011,42 
nor the later 2016 proposals, involved changes to Member States’ corporate tax 
rates. Indeed, the proposals relaunched in October 2016 consisted of two 
separate directives, one for a common corporate tax base (the CCTB)43 and the 
other, again, for a common consolidated corporate tax base (the CCCTB).44 The 
difference between the CCTB and the CCCTB is that the latter provides for 
cross-border consolidation of profits and losses, as well as for the elimination 
of intra-group transactions. Certainly, the momentum generated by the BEPS 
project helped fast-track this relaunch, as under the new proposals the focus of 
attention shifted from the objective of facilitating corporate groupings and 
simplifying compliance to countering tax avoidance.  
The first important feature of the original and the subsequent proposals is the 
provision for a common tax base. There are uniform rules for the calculation of 
the tax base of group members that fall under the scope of the draft Directives. 
The second important feature of the proposals is consolidation, that is, the 
automatic set-off of profits and losses and the elimination of intra-group 
transactions for group members. One important difference between the 2011 
and the 2016 proposals is that the provisions for consolidation have now been 
moved to a different directive so that there can at least be progress with the 
common tax base. Another important difference between the 2016 
CCTB/CCCTB proposals and the 2011 CCCTB proposal is that the new rules 
(that is, the common tax base and subsequent consolidation) are mandatory for 
large corporate groups — defined as groups with a consolidated turnover 
exceeding €750m.45 It is no longer an option for eligible groups to opt in to the 
new tax base, as it was in the 2011 proposal. However, companies falling 
outside the scope of the proposed directive46 may opt to apply its rules under 
certain conditions (voluntary opt-in).47 Therefore, the CCTB/CCCTB 
                                                 
42 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) COM(2011), 121 final, 16 March 2011. See generally HJI 
Panayi, EU Corporate Tax Law (n 4) ch 3. See also Christiana HJI Panayi, The Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base and the UK (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2011) (‘Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base’). 
43 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base, 
COM(2016)685 final, 25 October 2016 <https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/ 
taxation/files/com_2016_685_en.pdf> (‘Draft CCTB Directive’). 
44 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base, COM(2016)683 final (25 October 2016) <http://ec.europa.eu/ 
taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/com_2016_683_en.pdf> (‘Draft CCCTB Directive’). 
45 See Draft CCTB Directive (n 433) art 2(1)(c).  
46 Ibid art 2. 
47 Ibid art 2(3). 
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proposals, if enacted, would replace Member States’ corporate tax bases for 
eligible taxpayers rather than provide an additional optional tax base to choose 
from.  
Furthermore, the proposed rules are limited to EU-resident companies (the 
qualifying subsidiaries)48 and EU permanent establishments. Contrary to the 
2011 CCCTB proposal, the revised permanent establishment definition refers 
only to permanent establishments situated in the EU and belonging to a 
taxpayer resident for tax purposes in the EU. EU permanent establishments of 
third country companies are not covered; their position is to be dealt with in 
bilateral tax treaties and national law. 
The new common tax base is designed broadly. It is stipulated in the Preamble 
that all revenues will be taxable unless expressly exempted.49 The basic 
formulation of the tax base is the following: revenues less exempt revenues, 
deductible expenses and other deductible items.50 All these concepts are defined 
in the proposals. There is also a list of non-deductible expenses.51 The 2016 
CCTB proposal (like the original 2011 proposal) also contains detailed rules on 
depreciation.52 For the purposes of calculating the tax base, transactions are 
measured by reference, inter alia, to monetary consideration and market value.53  
What is novel in the 2016 CCTB proposal is the very generous provision for 
deduction: the super-deduction for research and development (‘R&D’) costs. It 
is provided that, on top of the amounts already deductible for R&D costs, a 
deduction of an extra 50% of R&D costs each tax year will be granted for costs 
up to €20m and 25% for expenditure above this level. An enhanced 100% extra 
deduction will be available to start-ups for R&D expenditure up to €20m.54 The 
CCTB does not provide for a patent or innovation box type of rules (that is, low 
or no taxes for patent revenue), but this is thought to be a good alternative to 
entice Member States to agree to the proposal and abandon their own patent 
box regimes. It will also help attract high-value R&D activities to the EU. 
                                                 
48 A ‘qualifying subsidiary’ is defined as every immediate and lower-tier subsidiary in which the 
parent company has a right to exercise more than 50% of the voting rights and it has an 
ownership right amounting to more than 75% of the subsidiary’s capital or profit: ibid art 5(1). 
49 Ibid Preamble 9. 
50 Ibid art 7. 
51 Ibid art 12. 
52 Ibid ch IV, arts 30–40.  
53 Ibid art 20. 
54 Ibid art 9(3). 
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Another addition to the CCTB proposal is the allowance for growth and 
investment (‘AGI’), which was inserted to neutralise the current asymmetry 
between debt and equity financing.55 The AGI is defined as the difference 
between the equity of a taxpayer and the tax value of its participation in the 
capital of associated enterprises.56 Pursuant to this rule, taxpayers will be given 
a deduction in respect of a notional yield on defined increases in their equity 
(the AGI equity base).57 This will be deductible from their taxable base subject 
to certain conditions dealing with anti-tax avoidance. In case of an AGI equity 
base decrease, an amount equal to the notional yield of the AGI equity decrease 
shall become taxable. ‘The outcome is a definitive advantage in favour of 
financing through debt as opposed to equity.’58 
The original 2011 CCCTB proposal and the 2016 CCCTB proposal set out the 
conditions for the formation of a consolidated tax group, as well as the 
mechanism for formulary apportionment and allocation of the consolidated tax 
base to the relevant Member States. In addition, there are rules for entering and 
leaving a group, the treatment of losses, business reorganisations and the intra-
group transfer of assets. Consolidation is mandatory to all groups that fall 
within the scope of the CCTB proposal, that is, groups with a consolidated 
group revenue exceeding €750m. The formula for apportionment is identical to 
the one proposed in the 2011 CCCTB proposal and is based on three equally-
weighted factors: labour, assets and sales.59 As in the 2011 proposal, intangible 
assets are excluded from the base of the asset factor and the sales factor is sales 
by destination.60 The 2016 CCCTB proposal also contains sector-specific 
formulae for financial institutions,61 insurance,62 oil and gas,63 shipping and air 
transport.64 
As in the original proposal, there are detailed administrative provisions for 
consolidated groups.65 The CCCTB is meant to offer qualifying groups a one-
stop-shop approach; the group would deal with one Member State tax 
                                                 
55 Ibid art 11. 
56 Ibid art 11(1). 
57 Ibid art 11(3). 
58 See Explanatory Memorandum preceding the draft CCTB Directive (n 43) 10. 
59 See Draft CCCTB Directive (n 44) ch VIII.  
60 Ibid arts 37–38. 
61 Ibid art 40. 
62 Ibid art 41. 
63 Ibid art 42. 
64 Ibid art 43. 
65 Ibid ch IX. 
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administration in the EU, which is usually the Member State where the group’s 
parent company is resident for tax purposes.66 
It should be emphasised that neither the initial CCCTB proposal, nor the 
subsequent ones, affect tax rates. The draft directives seek to harmonise the tax 
base and not the tax rates, though there have been unofficial calls to impose a 
minimum corporate tax rate.67 The CCTB/CCCTB determines the portion of 
the consolidated tax base that belongs to a Member State. Member States will 
be entitled to tax the income apportioned to them according to their own rates. 
This was emphasised by the European Commission upon the release of the 
original CCCTB Directive68 and reiterated in the press release of the 
subsequently proposed CCTB/CCCTB Directives. As stated: 
Corporate tax rates are not covered by the CCCTB, as these remain an area 
of national sovereignty. However, the CCCTB will create a more transparent, 
efficient and fair system for calculating the tax base of cross-border 
companies, which will substantially reform corporate taxation throughout the 
EU.69 
Although the CCCTB is not meant to affect tax rates (just the taxable income 
that will be apportioned to the relevant countries), if approved, it will reform 
the rules on corporate taxation in the EU — mainly in regard to multinationals.70 
                                                 
66 See ibid for detailed rules. 
67 See, eg, the call for a 25% rate by the European Trade Union Confederation: ‘ETUC Position 
on the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB)’, European Trade Union 
Confederation (Web Page, 16 October 2016) <https://www.etuc.org/en/document/etuc-
position-common-consolidated-corporate-tax-base-ccctb>. There has also been speculation 
that France and Germany want a minimum corporate tax rate. See Matthew Holehouse and 
Christopher Williams, ‘France and Germany Behind Plans for “Common EU Corporation 
Tax”’, The Telegraph (online, 26 May 2015) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ 
europe/eu/11630468/France-and-Germany-behind-plans-for-common-EU-corporation-
tax.html> and Ruth Berschens, Donata Riedel and Christopher Cermak, ‘EU: Shut Tax Havens 
with Minimum Rate’, Handelsblatt (online, 26 May 2015) <https://global.handelsblatt.com/ 
finance/a-tax-collision-course-223953>. In late 2018, it was reported that Germany wanted a 
minimum tax for large technology companies. See Mallory Locklear, ‘Germany Calls for 
Global Minimum Tax on Large Tech Companies’, Engadget (Web Page, 22 October 2018) 
<https://www.engadget.com/2018/10/22/germany-global-minimum-tax-large-tech-
companies/>.  
68 HJI Panayi, Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (n 42).  
69 See ‘Commission Proposes Major Corporate Tax Reform for the EU’, European Commission 
(Press Release, 25 October 2016) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3471_en.htm>.  
70 See Centre for European Economic Research, ‘The Impact of the CCTB on the Effective Tax 
Burden of Corporations: Results from the Tax Analyzer Model’ (Working Paper 75-2019, 
European Commission, 2019) <https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation 
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Whether there will be a spill-over effect on domestic corporate tax rules 
affecting taxpayers with a consolidated group revenue of less than €750 million 
remains to be seen. Furthermore, whether the harmonisation of the rules on the 
corporate tax base will also eventually lead to the harmonisation of tax rates (or 
the creation of bands of rates) also remains to be seen. Even though the 2016 
CCTB/CCCTB proposals have not yet been adopted, they remain high on the 
agenda of the European Commission, with several compromise texts appearing 
since the first relaunch.71  
Interestingly, there are currently two pending proposals that provide for the 
imposition of a tax and at a certain rate. One is a long-standing proposal for the 
imposition of a financial transaction tax and the other is a recent proposal for a 
3% digital services tax. 
The Directive to introduce a common system of Financial Transaction Tax 
(FTT) was published in 2011.72 The FTT was largely a reactive measure to the 
financial crisis, engulfing the EU (and the rest of the world) at the time. The 
FTT was indeed hailed as a levy imposed to ensure that the financial sector 
contributed to the costs of the financial crisis. The FTT was also meant to 
discourage excessively risky activities by financial institutions but it was not 
meant to affect citizens and businesses. It would only apply if one of the two 
parties was a financial institution and if one of the two parties — whether the 
financial institution or the non-financial institution — was established in a 
Member State.73 A tax of 0.1% for most financial transactions other than 
derivatives and 0.01% for derivative contracts was proposed. These were 
minimum rates and participating Member States were entitled to apply higher 
rates. It was proposed that each financial institution that was a party to the 
financial transaction would pay the tax and there would be joint and several 
liability as regards this charge. The European Commission estimated revenues 
                                                 
/files/taxation_paper_75.pdf>. This recent working paper explores the potential impact of the 
introduction of a Common Corporate Tax Base on the tax burden of corporations. 
71 See the latest Romanian Presidency compromise text of the Proposal for a Council Directive 
on a Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB) published by the Council of the European Union in 
June 2019: Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB), 
COM(2016) 685 final (6 June 2019) <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-
9676-2019-INIT/en/pdf>. See also the previous Austrian Presidency compromise text 
published in December 2018: Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax 
Base (CCTB), COM(2016) 685 final (5 December 2018) <https://data.consilium. 
europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13024-2018-INIT/en/pdf>.  
72 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common System of Financial 
Transaction Tax and amending Directive 2008/7/EC, COM(201) 594 final, 28 September 2011 
(‘2011 FTT Proposal’). 
73 For an analysis of the proposed rules, see HJI Panayi, Advanced Issues (n 21) ch 8. 
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of approximately €57 billion annually without clearly stipulating how the 
revenue would be used. It was thought that some of it would be allocated to the 
EU Budget, thus reducing the contributions of Member States. 
The proposed directive was never approved. From the beginning, the proposal 
was not seen favourably by a number of Member States, especially the UK, 
Sweden, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Malta and Denmark. By June 
2012 at the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (‘ECOFIN’) meeting, it 
became clear that the European Commission’s proposal would not gather the 
necessary support to be unanimously adopted by Member States. It could only 
be adopted through the enhanced cooperation procedure set out under the EU 
Treaties,74 which requires a minimum of nine Member States to adopt a 
legislative measure between themselves even if not all Member States agree to 
this measure.  
Adoption of this proposal through enhanced cooperation was instigated by 
Germany and France and eventually supported by the European Commission 
on 23 October 2012. The FTT proposal, backed by 10 Member States at the 
time and eventually by 11 Member States (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Slovenia and Slovakia) was approved 
by the European Parliament in December 2012. In January 2013, the adoption 
of the FTT through enhanced cooperation was approved by qualified majority 
at the ECOFIN Council. The UK, Luxembourg, Malta and the Czech Republic 
raised concerns that the European Commission had not provided any analysis 
of the impacts that an FTT through enhanced cooperation would have on 
individual Member States. The dissenting Member States abstained from 
voting. 
Thereafter, on 14 February 2013, the European Commission published a 
proposal for a Council directive implementing enhanced cooperation in the area 
of financial transaction tax,75 accompanied by another Impact Assessment.76 
There were some differences in the new proposal77 and the revenue estimate 
                                                 
74 TEU (n 1) art 20 and TFEU (n 2) arts 326–334. 
75 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive Implementing Enhanced 
Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction Tax, COM(2013)71 final, 14 February 2013. 
76 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, ‘Impact Assessment 
Accompanying the Document Proposal for a Council Directive Implementing Enhanced 
Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction Tax: Analysis of Policy Options and Impacts’ 
SWD(2013) 28 final, 14 February 2013. 
77 Compared to the 2011 FTT Proposal (n 73), the most important change was the introduction 
of the issuance principle, whereby financial instruments issued in the participating Member 
States will be taxed when traded, even if the parties trading them were not established in FTT 
Member States. This principle was thought to be the most contentious recommendation and in 
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was adjusted to €30–35 billion per year. Part of this would be added to the EU 
Budget directly as an own resource, reducing the contributions of participating 
Member States accordingly. This proposal had to be unanimously approved by 
the participating Member States to be adopted by them. 
The European Commission’s revised proposal was met with strong disapproval 
by the UK. Eventually, the UK Government challenged the authorising decision 
to adopt the FTT through enhanced cooperation at the CJEU,78 arguing that it 
would have extraterritorial effect and would result in non-participating Member 
States incurring implementation and collection costs. The CJEU rejected the 
UK’s request on the basis that its arguments were founded on the draft 
Directive, which was not part of the decision to authorise the use of enhanced 
cooperation.79 The gist of the decision was that, if and when an FTT is adopted 
under enhanced cooperation, it may be possible to challenge the measures at 
that point. Therefore, a subsequent challenge could be admissible, depending 
on the form and scope of any FTT. 
Even though this decision effectively gave participating countries the green 
light to proceed with enhanced cooperation, the FTT proposal is yet to be 
adopted. With Brexit, there are lingering doubts as to whether the FTT will go 
forward if its provisions do not apply to the UK, notwithstanding intermittent 
attempts by some Member States to force through the adoption of this proposal 
(or versions of it).80  
Another proposal which stipulates the imposition of a tax is the recent proposal 
for a digital services tax. This proposal was one of a high-profile package of 
                                                 
certain circumstances it could have extraterritorial effects. A General Anti-Abuse Rule has also 
been inserted. See HJI Panayi, Advanced Issues (n 21) ch 8 and Christiana HJI Panayi, ‘The 
EU’s Financial Transaction Tax, Enhanced Cooperation and the UK’s Challenge’ (2013) 53(8) 
European Taxation 358. 
78 United Kingdom v Council (CJEU, C-209/13, 30 April 2014). 
79 The review of the Court of Justice was limited to the issue of whether that decision was valid 
in light of art 20 TEU (n 1) and arts 326–334 TFEU (n 2), which defined the substantive and 
procedural conditions relating to the granting of such authorisation. The Court of Justice found 
the challenge to be premature. 
80 Since 2018, there have been reports that French and German finance ministers have suggested 
the relaunch of the FTT, and its adoption by all Member States. See Andrea Shalal, ‘Germany 
and France to Outline EU Financial Transaction Tax Proposal — Newspaper’, Reuters (Web 
Page, 2 December 2018) <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-europe-tax-germany-france/ 
germany-and-france-to-outline-eu-financial-transaction-tax-proposal-newspaper-idUKKBN 
1O10RN>. In January 2019 Germany and France fleshed out their plans and presented a joint 
position paper, which was referred to in the most recent ECOFIN progress report on the FTT. 
See Council of the European Union, State of Play of the Financial Transaction Tax (7 June 
2019) <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10097-2019-INIT/en/pdf>.  
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proposals, intended to introduce a ‘Fair and Effective Tax System in the EU for 
the Digital Single Market’.81 Although the international tax community had also 
attempted to tackle some of the problems arising in taxing the digital economy 
in the context of the BEPS project, it did not produce any concrete 
recommendations (or minimum standards).82 The EU has been much bolder in 
this area. In an earlier report published in 2014 by the EU Expert Group on 
Taxation of the Digital Economy,83 it was recommended that all goods and 
services should be taxed at the place of consumption.84 Whilst the Group argued 
that there was no need for a new concept of digital taxable presence; 
nevertheless, later initiatives focused on this point. Following a communication 
on a fair and efficient tax system for the single digital market in the European 
Union,85 on 21 March 2018, the European Commission produced several 
proposals, setting out its vision of short-term and long-term legislative 
measures.86 One of these was a proposal for a directive on the introduction of a 
digital permanent establishment concept based on significant digital presence. 
Another proposal was for a directive on a digital services tax. These proposals 
were accompanied by a Recommendation to Member States to amend their tax 
treaties with third countries so that the same rules would apply to EU and non-
EU companies.  
                                                 
81 See European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council, A Fair and Efficient Tax System in the European Union for the Digital Single 
Market, COM(2017) 547 final, 21 September 2017. 
82 See OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, Action 1 — 2015 Final 
Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD Publishing, 2015) Paris, 
12 <https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/addressing-the-tax-challenges-of-the-digital-
economy-action-1-2015-final-report_9789264241046-en#page1>. See also the more recent 
OECD interim report in this area: OECD, Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation — Interim 
Report 2018: Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
Project (OECD Publishing, 2018) <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264293083-en>. 
83 European Commission, Report of the Commission Expert Group on Taxation of the Digital 
Economy (28 May 2014) 5 <https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/ 
resources/documents/taxation/gen_info/good_governance_matters/digital/report_digital_econ
omy.pdf>.  
84 The Expert Group on Taxation of the Digital Economy suggested that the EU Mini One Stop 
which at the time already covered business-to-consumer sales of telecommunications, 
television/radio broadcasting and electronic services should be expanded into a broad One Stop 
Shop to cover all business-to-consumer transactions. See HJI Panayi, Advanced Issues (n 21) 
ch 5.  
85 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council, A Fair and Efficient Tax System in the European Union for the Digital Single 
Market, COM(2017) 547 final, 21 September 2017. 
86 Also see European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council, Time to Establish a Modern, Fair and Efficient Taxation Standard 
for the Digital Economy, COM(2018)146 final, 21 March 2018. 
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The first legislative proposal for a digital permanent establishment represents a 
long-term measure for taxing the digital economy. The proposal enables 
taxation of profits from digital activities, insofar as such profits are attributable 
to a significant digital presence maintained by entities (EU or non-EU) in a 
Member State.87 There are rules as to when significant digital presence is 
deemed to exist, and how to determine the profits which are attributable to it. 
Through its Recommendation,88 the European Commission also put forward a 
proposal to amend existing tax treaties between Member States and third 
countries to incorporate the new rules. Overall, this is a proposal which will 
affect the tax base of a Member State, as it establishes when certain activities 
would be taxable for giving rise to a permanent establishment in the State. 
The second legislative proposal which is important for our purposes represents 
a short-term measure: the introduction of a digital services tax on revenues 
resulting from the provision of certain digital services.89 The digital services tax 
will apply at the rate of 3% on gross revenues created from activities where 
users have played a major role in value creation, for example through selling 
online advertising space; making available to users a multi-sided digital 
interface; and transmission of data collected about users and generated from 
users’ activities on digital interfaces. This approach follows the logic that it was 
the user’s involvement in the digital activities of a company which generated 
the value for that company, even though the user may have made no payment 
to the company.90 Only entities with total annual worldwide revenues of €750 
million and EU taxable revenues of €50 million will be subject to this tax, 
irrespective of whether they are established in a Member State or third country. 
The European Commission estimated that €5 billion per year could be 
generated for Member States if the tax were applied at a rate of 3%.91  
Luxembourg and Ireland have vehemently opposed the digital services tax, 
calling for discussions on a global approach at the OECD level. Opposition to 
the European Commission’s proposals is also growing, with Lithuania, the 
Czech Republic, Malta and several Nordic countries thought to be against the 
                                                 
87 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive Laying Down Rules Relating to the 
Corporate Taxation of a Significant Digital Presence, COM(2018) 147 final, 21 March 2018. 
88 European Commission, Commission Recommendation of 21.3.2018 Relating to the Corporate 
Taxation of a Significant Digital Presence, C(2018) 1650 final, 21 March 2018. 
89 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the Common System of a Digital 
Services Tax on Revenues Resulting from the Provision of Certain Digital Services, 
COM(2018) 148 final, 21 March 2018. 
90 Ibid 11. 
91 See ‘Questions and Answers on a Fair and Efficient Tax System in the EU for the Digital 
Single Market’, European Commission (Fact Sheet, 21 March 2018) <http://europa. 
eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-2141_en.htm>.  
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proposals.92 Even Member States that were initially in favour of an EU solution 
are now more reluctant to adopt such a solution — or at least this EU solution.93 
One recurrent argument is that this shift in taxing rights based on the location 
of the digital user is a major deviation from internationally recognised taxation 
principles and should be agreed upon first at an international level and not by 
the EU unilaterally. Even the European Parliament has proposed94 that a sunset 
clause should be introduced, under which a digital services tax would be a 
temporary levy valid until an agreement has been reached internationally. It 
was also recommended that the Member States most adversely affected by the 
introduction of the tax could be allocated a greater part of the revenue from the 
interim tax.95  
Against this background, unsurprisingly, at the December 2018 ECOFIN 
meeting, the Austrian Presidency did not gain the necessary support for the 
proposal to be approved. This notwithstanding the fact that France and 
Germany had presented a joint compromise proposal to narrow the scope of the 
digital services tax proposal, with a view to targeting exclusively companies 
engaged in online advertising. Similarly, at the March 2019 ECOFIN meeting, 
Member States again did not reach agreement on the proposed digital 
advertising tax, which was effectively a watered-down version of the European 
Commission’s digital services tax proposal. This was due to opposition by 
Nordic countries and Ireland. The Romanian Presidency noted that Member 
States and the Council would continue to work in this area in order to reach 
consensus before the G20’s summit in Osaka, in June 2019. No consensus was, 
however, reached by that point in time, due to the strong divergent views of 
Member States.96 Whether this or another watered-down version of the 
European Commission’s digital tax proposals will be eventually approved, or 
                                                 
92 See HJI Panayi, ‘European Tax Law’ (n 4) [22].  
93 For example, even Germany had its misgivings about the initial proposal after automakers 
expressed concern they would be hit by the tax. See Timothy Rooks, ‘Taxes Coming to Big 
Data in Germany?’, DW (Web Page, 29 May 2018) <https://www.dw.com/en/taxes-coming-
to-big-data-in-germany/a-43972540>.  
94 See European Parliament, Draft Report on the Proposal for a Council Directive on the 
Common System of a Digital Services Tax on Revenues Resulting from the Provision of Certain 
Digital Services (COM(2018)0148 – C8-0137/2018 – 2018/0073(CNS)), 21 September 2018. 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fNONSGML% 
2bCOMPARL%2bPE-627.911%2b01%2bDOC%2bPDF%2bV0%2f%2fEN>.  
95 Ibid. Other amendments included a rate increase from 3% to 5% and a broadening of the scope 
to cover the supply of digital content and online sales. 
96 See conclusions of the ECOFIN meeting on 17 May 2019: ‘Outcome of the Council Meeting, 
3691st Council Meeting’ ECOFIN, 9434/19 (17 May 2019) 4 <https://www.consilium. 
europa.eu/media/39434/st09434-en19.pdf>. 
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whether these controversial proposals will follow the fate of the beleaguered 
proposal for a Financial Transaction Tax, remains to be seen.  
In any case, any Commission proposals that include uniform rules on 
calculating the tax base and imposing tax rates are likely to meet with strong 
resistance from Member States. Whilst the impending departure from the EU 
of one of the most powerful Eurosceptic Member States might weaken this 
resistance,97 in the absence of international convergence on what should be 
included in a tax base and what should be the (minimum) tax rate, it is unlikely 
that the EU will take any large-scale tax harmonising action internally. The lack 
of legislative bases and the need for unanimity certainly do not help. Of course, 
if the European Commission ever manages to convince all Member States (or 
at least enough Member States to activate the enhanced cooperation 
mechanism) to adopt the CCTB, this could pave the way for more uniformity 
of corporate tax rates - or at least the introduction of a minimum corporate tax 
rate. 
Arguably, the European Commission might not even need to await the 
introduction of the CCTB in order to politically manoeuvre a uniform tax rate 
or a minimum tax rate. In the past, there were reports that the European 
Commission would propose the abandonment of the unanimity rule on tax 
issues so as to promote more efficient law-making.98 In a letter of intent99 
accompanying his annual State of the Union address,100 Jean-Claude Juncker 
stated that the European Commission would in 2019 issue a communication 
identifying areas in the taxation field for which qualified majority voting could 
be introduced. Indeed, in January 2019, the Commission published a bold 
proposal101 to move away from unanimity to qualified majority voting in the 
                                                 
97 Ironically, the UK is considering introducing unilateral rules for the taxation of the digital 
economy. See, for example, the UK Treasury’s Corporate Tax and the Digital Economy: 
Position Paper (November 2017) and Corporate Tax and the Digital Economy: Position Paper 
Update (March 2018) <https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/corporate-tax-and-the-
digital-economy-position-paper>. 
98 Elodie Lamer, ‘EU to Identify Tax Matters for Qualified Majority Voting’ (2018) 91 (17 
September 2018) Tax Notes International 1250. 
99 Jean-Claude Juncker and Frans Timmermans, State of the Union 2018. Letter of Intent to 
President Antonio Tajani and to Chancellor Sebastian Kurz (12 September 2018) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-letter-of-intent_en.pdf>. 
100 Jean-Claude Juncker, ‘State of the Union 2018. The Hour of European Sovereignty’ European 
Commission (Speech, 12 September 2018) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/state-
union-2018-hour-european-sovereignty-2018-sep-12_en>.  
101 Commission Communication, ‘Towards a More Efficient and Democratic Decision Making 
in EU Tax Policy’ COM (2019) 8 final, 15/1/2019. Indicatively, in this Communication it was 
noted that ‘[f]or the Commission, the question is no longer whether there is a need to move 
away from unanimity in taxation, but rather how and when to do it’: at 11.  
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tax area. The Commission proposed to move to qualified majority voting 
through a very ambitious four stage roadmap, which would eventually 
encompass many areas of fiscal policy. Whilst this matter is highly political, in 
the current political context a complete abandonment of Member States’ fiscal 
veto seems rather unlikely. However, nothing is impossible when it comes to 
the EU.  
III EU ANTI-ABUSE RULES 
Most corporate tax systems contain rules which prevent their abuse. Often, the 
more sophisticated the corporate tax system, the more sophisticated and 
complex the anti-abuse rules of the system are likely to be. As the EU does not 
have a harmonised and comprehensive corporate tax system other than the de 
minimis and ad hoc rules briefly discussed in Part I, one would not expect to 
find any self-standing anti-abuse rules other than those encompassed in these 
de minimis rules. Nevertheless, the European Commission seized on the 
political momentum generated by the OECD/G20’s BEPS project and its 
aftermath, and produced a proposal for a wide range of common anti-abuse 
rules which was eventually approved in Council. This was the Anti-Tax 
Avoidance Directive (‘ATAD’).  
The ATAD was part of the European Commission’s Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Package, which was published in January 2016.102 This Package emanated from 
the European Commission’s ambitious agenda for a fairer, simpler and more 
effective corporate tax system in the EU. This approach to anti-abuse issues 
was foreshadowed in its Action Plan for a Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax 
System, which was published in June 2015, a few months before the 
OECD/G20 BEPS Final Reports were themselves published.103 The Action 
Plan had been released as a Commission Communication104 and was intended 
to improve the corporate tax environment in the European Union, making it 
fairer, more efficient and more growth-friendly. The key actions included a 
strategy to relaunch the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (as 
explained in the previous Part of this article) and a framework for effective 
taxation where profits are generated, largely premised on the OECD/G20’s 
                                                 
102 European Commission, Anti Tax Avoidance Package (Web Page, January 2016) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/anti-tax-avoidance-package 
_en>. See analysis in Christiana HJI Panayi, ‘The Europeanisation of Good Tax Governance’ 
(2018) 36(1) Yearbook of European Law 442, part III(C) (‘Europeanisation of Good Tax 
Governance’). 
103 BEPs Action Plan (n 38).  
104 ‘A Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System’ (n 41). 
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BEPS conclusions. It was not a major surprise, therefore, when the Anti-Tax 
Avoidance Package was published early in 2016.  
This Package consisted of seven parts: a proposed Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Directive;105 a Recommendation on the implementation of the BEPS 
recommendations on tax treaty abuse and on permanent establishments;106 a 
proposed amendment to the Directive on Administrative Cooperation to include 
mandatory country-by-country reporting requirements;107 a general policy 
Communication;108 a Communication on an EU external strategy for effective 
taxation;109 a European Commission Staff Working Document;110 and a Study 
on Aggressive Tax Planning.111  
In the initial ATAD proposal,112 the European Commission proposed action in 
three areas covered by the BEPS proposals, namely: hybrid mismatches,113 
interest restrictions,114 and Controlled Foreign Corporation (‘CFC’) rules.115 
The European Commission also proposed action in three areas not covered by 
the BEPS Action plan, namely: a general anti-abuse rule (‘GAAR’), a switch-
over clause and rules to tackle exit taxation. Political agreement on the 
                                                 
105 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive Laying Down Rules Against Tax 
Avoidance Practices that Directly Affect the Functioning of the Internal Market, 
COM/2016/026 final, 28 January 2016. 
106 European Commission, Commission Recommendation of 28.1.2016 on the Implementation of 
Measures Against Tax Treaty Abuse, C(2016) 271 final, 28 January 2016. 
107 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive 2011/16/EU as 
regards Mandatory Automatic Exchange of Information in the Field of Taxation, 
COM/2016/025 final - 2016/010 (CNS), 28 January 2016.  
108 European Commission, Commission Communication, Anti-Tax Avoidance Package: Next 
Steps towards Delivering Effective Taxation and Greater Tax Transparency in the EU, 
COM(2016) 23 final, 28 January 2016. 
109 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council on an External Strategy for Effective Taxation, COM(2016) 24 final, 28 
January 2018 (‘External Strategy Communication’). 
110 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying the document 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council — Anti Tax 
Avoidance Package: Next Steps towards Delivering Effective Taxation and Greater Tax 
Transparency in the EU, SWD/2016/06 final, 28 January 2016. 
111 Henrik Meldgaard et al, Study on Structures of Aggressive Tax Planning and Indicators, Final 
Report (Taxation Papers, Working Paper No 61, European Commission, 23 December 2015). 
112 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive Laying Down Rules against Tax 
Avoidance Practices that Directly Affect the Functioning of the Internal Market, COM(2016) 
26 final, 28 January 2016. 
113 BEPS Action Plan (n 38) Action 2.  
114 Ibid Action 4.  
115 Ibid Action 3.  
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Directive was finally reached on 17 June 2016, after several amendments and 
the deletion of the switch-over clause from the Directive. On 12 July 2016, the 
Council of the European Union formally adopted the new version of the 
ATAD.116  
Pursuant to the ATAD, all taxpayers that are subject to corporate tax in a 
Member State, including subsidiaries of companies based in third countries 
will, from the date that the provisions of the Directive become effective,117 be 
scrutinised on the basis of the five anti-abuse rules.118 The ATAD now provides 
for: 
a) uniform (but de minimis) interest limitation rules to prevent 
multinational groups from artificially shifting their debt to jurisdictions 
with more generous deductibility rules;  
b) exit taxation rules to ensure that, where a taxpayer moves assets or its 
tax residence out of the tax jurisdiction of a State, that State taxes the 
economic value of any capital gain created in its territory even though 
that gain has not yet been realised at the time of the exit;  
c) a GAAR to cover gaps that may exist in Member State’s specific anti-
abuse rules; 
d) CFC rules to prevent the shifting of large amounts of profits towards 
controlled subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions; and  
e) rules on hybrid mismatches to prevent corporate taxpayers from taking 
advantage of disparities between national tax systems in order to reduce 
their overall tax liability.  
                                                 
116 Council Directive 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 Laying Down Rules against Tax Avoidance 
Practices that Directly Affect the Functioning of the Internal Market [2016] OJ L 193/1 
(‘ATAD’). 
117 Technically, Member States had until 31 December 2018 to transpose the ATAD into their 
national laws and regulations, except for the exit taxation rules, for which they have until 31 
December 2019. Member States that have targeted rules that are equally effective to the interest 
limitation rules may apply them until the OECD reaches an agreement on a minimum standard, 
or until 1 January 2024 at the latest.  
118 ATAD (n 116) art 1.  
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The scope of this latter provision was further broadened to include provisions 
against hybrid mismatch arrangements with third countries.119 
Overall, most of these provisions seem to be out of place, and rather paradoxical 
given the framework into which they were transplanted. For example, whilst 
there are no harmonised rules (under EU law) as to what gains should be taxable 
in a Member State and what the tax rate should be, there is a provision to ensure 
that if such gains are taxable in the Member State of origin (of the taxpayer), 
then part of the economic value of the gain should be awarded to that Member 
State when the taxpayer becomes non-resident, even if that gain has not yet 
been realised at that point.120 Similarly, whilst EU law does not provide for 
specific anti-avoidance rules other than the ATAD rules and those arising from 
the Directives, nevertheless, a general anti-avoidance rule ensures that no gaps 
are left by domestic anti-abuse rules. Furthermore, whilst there is as yet no EU 
requirement for a minimum corporate tax rate, there are now provisions which 
effectively penalise a company for owning and controlling subsidiaries in low-
tax jurisdictions. Finally, whilst there are no common corporate tax rules other 
than those set out in the directives discussed above, nevertheless benefiting 
from mismatches in the national tax legislations of Member States leading to 
double non-taxation is now against EU law.  
There is also a further, more general criticism. If the EU does not have the 
competence to harmonise direct tax legislation (including corporate tax 
legislation) and is restricted to ad hoc targeted solutions, then how can it 
harmonise the exception to these otherwise unharmonised rules? Arguably, as 
far as the ATAD was concerned, competence was conceded as all Member 
                                                 
119 This was following a further proposal by the Commission. See European Commission, 
Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Document Proposal for a Council 
Directive Amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as Regards Hybrid Mismatches with Third 
Countries, COM(2016) 687 final, 25 October 2016. Apart from closing the loopholes as a result 
of the rules not being applied to third country taxpayers, one important reason for this proposal 
was to align the rules with the corresponding provisions in the CCTB proposal. Under this 
proposal, the hybrid provisions would not only apply to mismatch arrangements within the EU, 
but also to mismatches arising in relation to third countries. The hybrid provisions would also 
deal with mismatches involving permanent establishments, imported mismatches, hybrid 
transfers and dual resident mismatches. This proposed amendment to the ATAD (also often 
referred to as ATAD II) was adopted in May 2017. Member States have until 31 December 2019 
to adopt rules to implement ATAD II. In line with the compromise agreement, the adopted 
ATAD II Directive includes a carve-out option through to 31 December 2022, for hybrid 
regulatory capital in the banking sector, and a carve-out for financial traders involving hybrid 
transfers made in the ordinary course of business. 
120 Under ATAD (n 1166) art 5, when a taxpayer becomes non-resident, then the taxpayer is 
subject to tax at an amount equal to the market value of the transferred assets, at the time of exit 
of the assets. The taxpayer has the option to pay this pre-determined amount in five yearly 
instalments. There are no provisions for reductions in value. 
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States agreed to the proposal, though some did so more reluctantly than others. 
It is, however, unfortunate that EU law was the medium used to transpose into 
national legislation BEPS-related measures, which were quite extrinsic to the 
EU legal system up to that point. As is shown below, this potentially causes 
further uncertainties in this area, as some of the legislative provisions are at 
odds with established case law of the CJEU.  
In addition to these targeted anti-abuse rules, anti-abuse clauses long existed in 
the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, the Merger Directive and the Interest and 
Royalties Directive.121 The aim of these clauses is to prevent the forms of relief 
provided under the Directives from being abused. For example, the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive and the Interest and Royalties Directive allow domestic or 
agreement-based provisions required for the prevention of fraud or abuse.122 
The Parent-Subsidiary Directive also contains a provision which prevents relief 
from being granted in situations of mismatches in the tax treatment of profit 
distributions which would lead to double non-taxation.123 Furthermore, under 
the recently adopted Tax Dispute Resolution Directive, a Member State may 
deny access to a dispute resolution procedure in cases where penalties were 
imposed in that Member State in relation to adjusted income or capital for tax 
fraud, wilful default and gross negligence.124 
It should be emphasised that, up until the ATAD’s anti-abuse rules were 
introduced, the anti-abuse provisions of the relevant directives constituted the 
only EU anti-abuse legislation existing at the time. In fact, up until very 
recently, the focus of attention of most EU institutions and, generally speaking, 
the European Commission and the CJEU, was on whether Member State anti-
abuse rules were compatible with fundamental freedoms and the non-
discrimination principle in general. The high-water mark of this approach was 
the CJEU’s judgment in the Cadbury Schweppes case.125 
This was the first important case that dealt with CFC regimes, and the focus 
was on the UK rules existing at the time. According to the legislation, a resident 
company was subject to corporation tax on its worldwide profits, which, at the 
time, included the profits of a foreign branch126 but not the profits of a foreign 
                                                 
121 See Parent-Subsidiary Directive (n 23) art 1(2); Interest and Royalties Directive (n 24) art 5; 
Merger Directive (n 22) art 15.  
122 See Parent-Subsidiary Directive (n 23) art 1(2); Interest and Royalties Directive (n 24) art 5. 
123 See Parent-Subsidiary Directive (n 23) art 4(1)(a). 
124 Tax Dispute Resolution Directive (n 27) art 16(6).  
125 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas (C-196/04) [2006] ECR I-07995 
(‘Cadbury Schweppes’). 
126 Under the current UK regime, branches can now be exempt. 
26 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 24 
subsidiary. Broadly, a UK parent company was taxed on the profits of the 
foreign subsidiary only when they were distributed to it as dividends. When the 
UK CFC legislation was triggered, the profits of a foreign subsidiary were 
attributed to the UK parent company at the time at which the profits arose and 
were taxed, with a credit for the foreign tax paid by the subsidiary. If the 
subsidiary subsequently distributed a dividend, this tax could be credited 
against the tax payable by the parent company on the dividend. 
In this case, Cadbury Schweppes, a UK company, indirectly held 100% of the 
shares of two Irish subsidiaries. These subsidiaries were subject to a 10% 
corporate tax rate under the International Financial Services Centre regime in 
Dublin,127 which was lower than the UK tax rate. As none of the exemptions 
under the UK CFC rules applied, Cadbury Schweppes was taxed by the UK tax 
authorities on the profits of its Irish subsidiaries. The case was eventually 
referred to the CJEU. 
The CJEU held that the UK legislation had to be examined in light of the 
freedom of establishment only.128 It was found that the UK CFC rules restricted 
the freedom of establishment because the profits of a controlled company were 
only attributed to the UK parent company when this controlled company was 
incorporated in a low-tax Member State, within the meaning of the UK CFC 
rules. Profits were not attributed to the UK parent if the controlled company 
was a UK resident.129 Such a difference of treatment dissuaded UK-resident 
companies from establishing, acquiring or maintaining a subsidiary in a 
Member State with such a lower level of taxation and therefore constituted a 
restriction on the freedom of establishment.130 
This restriction was justified on the basis of prevention of tax avoidance and 
evasion. It was emphasised that the mere fact that a resident company 
established a secondary establishment such as a subsidiary in another Member 
State could not justify a general presumption of tax evasion.131 A national 
measure restricting the freedom of establishment could only be justified when 
                                                 
127 This regime has now been phased out. 
128 It was explained that the UK CFC rules applied to resident companies that had a controlling 
holding in their subsidiary established outside the United Kingdom. This gave the resident 
company definite influence over the subsidiary’s decisions and allowed the resident companies 
to determine the subsidiary’s activities. Although the rules had restrictive effects on the free 
movement of services and the free movement of capital, such effects were an unavoidable 
consequence of any restriction on the freedom of establishment. Cadbury Schweppes (n 125) 
[31]–[33].  
129 Ibid [44]. 
130 Ibid [45]. 
131 Ibid [50]. 
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it specifically related to ‘wholly artificial arrangements which do not reflect 
economic reality, with a view to escaping the tax normally due on the profits 
generated by activities carried out on national territory’.132 
Although the UK CFC rules were suitable for the attainment of this objective, 
they also had to be proportional. The CFC rules had to exclude from their scope 
situations where, despite the existence of tax motives, the arrangements 
reflected economic reality.  
This reasoning was followed in numerous cases.133 Later cases emphasised that, 
as regards proportionality, the taxpayer must be given the opportunity, without 
being subject to undue administrative constraints, to provide evidence of any 
commercial justification for that transaction.134 Also, where there is re-
characterisation of an interest payment, this re-characterisation should be 
limited to the proportion of that interest which exceeds the arm’s length 
amount.135  
What is evident from this brief exposition is that, hitherto, in most cases 
litigated at the CJEU, the emphasis was mostly on the compatibility of national 
anti-abuse provisions with EU law and not the protection of the tax bases of 
Member States. Very importantly, this appears to be the approach even in the 
post-BEPS era, although there are calls for the CJEU to be more attuned to the 
risk of tax avoidance or double non-taxation.136 In recent cases dealing with the 
anti-abuse provisions of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, it was reiterated that 
such provisions should still be targeted against wholly artificial arrangements 
and should not be too broadly phrased. In the Eqiom & Enka case,137 it was 
                                                 
132 Ibid [55]. 
133 See HJI Panayi, EU Corporate Tax Law (n 4) ch 8. See also Christiana HJI Panayi, ‘Cadbury 
Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas (2006): CFC Rules Under EU Tax Law’ in John 
Snape and Dominic de Cogan (eds), Landmark Cases in Revenue Law (Hart Publishing, 2019) 
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134 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation v Commissioners of Inland Revenue (C-
524/04) [2007] ECR I-2107. 
135 Ibid. 
136 See NN A/S v Skatteministeriet (CJEU, C-28/17, 4 July 2018) (‘NN A/S’), where Advocate 
General Campos argued that the restrictive tax rule was justified by the prevention of double 
deduction of losses, a justification that was especially pertinent following the OECD BEPS 
project and art 2 of the ATAD Directive on hybrid mismatches. See NN A/S [65]–[73]. Whilst 
the CJEU agreed on the issue of justification, it did not refer to the BEPS project or any other 
instruments.  
137 Eqiom SAS and Enka SA v Ministre des Finances et des Comptes publics (CJEU, C-6/16, 7 
September 2017). 
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emphasised that there cannot be an initial presumption of abuse where an EU 
parent company was controlled by shareholders in third states. A similar 
conclusion was reached in the Diester Holding case.138  
Where does this discord leave us as far as a harmonised corporate tax base is 
concerned? Certainly, anti-abuse rules are crucial to any system as they protect 
the corporate tax base. However, the co-existence of the current ad hoc anti-
abuse rules (whether as part of other directives or as substantive provisions in 
the ATAD) with the principles derived from the case law of the CJEU appears 
to be contradictory. The author has argued elsewhere that some of the 
provisions of the ATAD may not be aligned with the case law of the CJEU.139 
Broadly, the scope of the anti-abuse rules in the directives (and especially in 
the ATAD) tends to be rather broad, placing the burden of proof on taxpayers. 
However, case law suggests that national anti-abuse rules should be targeted 
against wholly artificial arrangements, thus shifting the burden of proof onto 
the tax authorities to show that this is the case. In fact, as part of the 
proportionality assessment, the case law requires that taxpayers be given the 
opportunity to prove the commerciality of the arrangement. These contradictory 
positions are not conducive to legal certainty. Rather, they jeopardise any future 
attempts to streamline the EU’s corporate tax system.  
IV EU TRANSFER PRICING RULES? 
Apart from the above legislation on anti-abuse rules and the, often 
contradictory, relevant case law, there is a combination of soft law and hard law 
for the regulation of transfer pricing. For a long time, the Arbitration 
Convention was a key instrument in this area. This was a convention signed by 
all Member States, dealing with the elimination of double taxation arising from 
transfer pricing adjustments and the settlement disputes between Member State 
competent authorities on the basis of the arm’s length principle.140 Guidance 
was given on the implementation of the Convention through soft law 
instruments,141 many of which were produced by the European Commission’s 
                                                 
138 See Deister Holding AG v Bundeszentralamt für Steuern (CJEU, C-504/16, 20 December 
2017). 
139 HJI Panayi, Advanced Issues (n 21) ch 7. 
140 Convention on the Elimination of Double Taxation in Connection with the Adjustment of 
Profits of Associated Enterprises — Final Act [1990] OJ L 225/10. 
141 For example, the Code of Conduct for the effective implementation of the EU Arbitration 
Convention. This Code of Conduct seeks to ensure a more effective and uniform application of 
the Arbitration Convention by all Member States. Also see Revised Code of Conduct for the 
Effective Implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of Double Taxation in 
Connection with the Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises [2009] OJ C 322/1. See 
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Joint Transfer Pricing Forum.142 The new Tax Dispute Resolution Directive 
Convention does not officially replace the Arbitration Convention but certainly 
provides a more efficient route for taxpayers to take in resolving their tax 
disputes with competent authorities.  
So far, the CJEU has considered transfer pricing issues in two cases referred to 
it. Both cases were decided in a rather conservative way. In the first case dealing 
with transfer pricing rules, the SGI case,143 it was questioned whether the 
Belgian rules were compatible with the non-discrimination provision, the 
freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital rules.  
Here, a Belgian holding company, Société de Gestion Industrielle SA (SGI), 
made an interest-free loan to a French subsidiary and paid management 
expenses to a Luxembourg corporate shareholder, who was also the director 
and managing director of SGI. For the interest-free loan, the Belgian tax 
authorities added a notional interest payment to SGI’s tax base and they refused 
to allow a business expense deduction for the management fees. SGI challenged 
these assessments and the case was referred to the CJEU. 
The CJEU found that the Belgian legislation restricted the freedom of 
establishment144 but it was justified on the basis that it preserved the balanced 
                                                 
also the Code of Conduct on Transfer Pricing Documentation for Associated Enterprises in the 
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142 See European Commission, Report on the Application of the Profit Split Method within the 
EU (March 2019) JTPF/002/2019/EN; European Commission, Report on the Use of 
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Commission, Draft Report on Cost Contribution Arrangements on Services Not Creating 
Intangible Property (May 2012) JTPF/008/REV1/2012/EN; European Commission, Report on 
Transfer Pricing Risk Management (June 2013) JTPF/007/FINAL/2013/EN; European 
Commission, Final Report on Secondary Adjustments (2012) JTPF/017/FINAL/2012/EN; 
European Commission, Report on Compensating Adjustments (2013) 
JTPF/009/FINAL/2013/EN. 
143 Société de Gestion Industrielle (SGI) v État belge [2010] OJ C 63/8 (‘SGI’). 
144 Ibid [55]. 
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allocation of taxing powers between Member States.145 The CJEU also found 
the legislation to be justified on the basis of preventing tax avoidance, even 
though the national legislation was not specifically designed to counteract 
purely artificial arrangements.146 In the judgment, the Court used inconsistent 
terms to identify tax avoidance.147 
In any case, for the legislation to be proportional, two grounds had to be 
satisfied. First, on each occasion where there was a suspicion that a transaction 
went beyond what the companies would have agreed under fully competitive 
conditions, the taxpayer had to be given an opportunity, without being subject 
to undue administrative constraints, to provide evidence of any commercial 
justification that there may have been for that transaction.148 Secondly, where 
the consideration of such elements led to the conclusion that the transaction 
went beyond what the companies would have agreed under fully competitive 
conditions, the corrective tax measure had to be confined to the part which 
exceeded what would have been agreed if the companies did not have a 
relationship of interdependence.149 The CJEU concluded that it was for the 
referring court to decide whether the Belgian legislation went beyond what was 
necessary to attain the objectives pursued by the legislation, taken together.150 
In another recent case on transfer pricing, the Hornbach-Baumarkt case,151 it 
was questioned whether the German transfer pricing legislation was compatible 
with the freedom of establishment. The legislation applied only to cross-border 
situations and did not allow the taxpayer to rely for justification on commercial 
reasons resulting from its status as a shareholder of the foreign subsidiary. In 
this case, a German parent company had given guarantees and letters of comfort 
to banks with respect to loans made to foreign subsidiaries, but without 
requiring any payment or consideration. The German tax authorities adjusted 
                                                 
145 Ibid [60]–[64]. As noted, giving companies the right to elect to have their losses or profits 
taken into account in their Member State or in another Member State could seriously undermine 
a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between the Member States, since the tax 
base would be increased in one of the Member States, and reduced in the other, by the amount 
of the losses or profits transferred. 
146 Ibid [66]. 
147 The CJEU initially used the term ‘wholly artificial arrangements’ (ibid [65]), then ‘purely 
artificial arrangements’ (at [66]) and later just ‘artificial arrangements’ (at [67]). See Opinion 
Statement of the CFE on the case law of the European Court of Justice on transfer pricing 
related to loans (at [10]). 
148 Ibid [71]. 
149 Ibid [72]. 
150 Ibid [75]. 
151 Hornbach-Baumarkt-AG v Finanzamt Landau (CJEU, C-382/16, 31 May 2018) (‘Hornbach-
Baumarkt’). 
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the profits of the parent company upwards and the parent company challenged 
this decision. The case was eventually referred to the CJEU which concluded 
that there was no incompatibility.  
The CJEU found that the transfer pricing legislation constituted a restriction to 
the freedom of establishment.152 This restriction was justified by the need to 
preserve the balanced allocation of taxing rights between the Member States, 
provided that the transfer pricing legislation was aimed at preventing profit 
shifting via transactions that were not in accordance with market conditions. 
The CJEU did not consider whether the restriction was justified on the basis of 
preventing tax avoidance, as no such argument had been advanced.153 
The CJEU went on to examine the proportionality of the German transfer 
pricing legislation and to clarify the meaning of the concept of ‘commercial 
justification’. It was questioned whether this concept included economic 
reasons resulting from the very existence of a relationship of interdependence 
between the parent company and its subsidiaries which were resident in another 
Member State.154 The CJEU found that there may be a commercial justification 
by virtue of the fact that the taxpayer was a shareholder in the foreign group 
companies, which would justify the conclusion of the transaction under non-
arm’s length terms.155 As the gratuitous granting of comfort letters containing 
a guarantee statement could be explained by the economic interest of the 
shareholder in the financial success of the foreign group subsidiaries, this could 
be sufficient commercial justification. This being the case, the German 
legislation did not go beyond what was necessary to achieve the objective 
pursued, to the extent that ‘the authorities responsible for the enforcement of 
that legislation afford the resident taxpayer the opportunity to prove that the 
terms were agreed on for commercial reasons which could result from its status 
as a shareholder in the non-resident company, which is a matter for the referring 
court to assess’.156 
This is a very important decision. Contrary to the advice of the Advocate 
General, the CJEU did not rely on tax avoidance or profit shifting reasons to 
justify the legislation. Rather, its acceptance of commercial justification and 
what that encompasses could pave the way for what the Advocate General 
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warned to be ‘a blunt and full exclusion of any business transactions with 
subsidiaries from the application of the [arm’s length] principle, because a 
parent will always have interest in seeing its subsidiary prosper’.157 
By not insisting on wholly artificial arrangements, both cases seem to confirm 
that the CJEU is taking a slightly different approach from that taken under other 
anti-abuse rules. Perhaps this is understandable, as there is much more 
developed international soft law — or at least international convergence on 
some concepts — which is set out in the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
However, this does not mean that the CJEU will eschew any discussion or 
challenge over some provisions of, or practices under, national transfer pricing 
regimes, even if those provisions or practices emanate from established 
principles under the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines. It would seem that 
this is encouraged by the European Commission, if one considers the recent 
state aid challenges over the transfer pricing practices of some Member States.  
The prohibition on state aid158 is another EU treaty provision that has had a 
huge impact on transfer pricing. This provision applies when aid, in the sense 
of a benefit or advantage, is granted by a Member State or through Member 
State resources. The aid must favour certain undertakings or the production of 
certain goods (the ‘selectivity’ principle), it must distort or threaten to distort 
competition, and must be capable of affecting trade between Member States. 
The state aid prohibition has become very important in the tax field. Measures 
that relieve the recipients of charges that are normally borne from their 
budgets,159 such as reductions in the tax base, total or partial reduction in the 
amount of tax (exemption or tax credit) payable, and deferment, cancellation or 
even special rescheduling of tax debts, are, according to the European 
Commission, examples of state aid.160 Such measures mitigate the charge that 
would normally be recoverable from the undertaking. A company may be 
affected by the state aid prohibition whether it is the recipient of aid or the 
competitor of such a company.161 Aid given to a company may have to be repaid 
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158 TFEU (n 2) art 107. 
159 Commission Notice on the Application of the State Aid Rules to Measures Relating to Direct 
Business Taxation [1998] OJ C384/3 3–9 [9] (‘1998 Notice’). For a commentary on the 1998 
Notice, see European Commission, Report on the Implementation of the Commission Notice on 
the Application of the State Aid Rules to Measures Relating to Direct Business Taxation, 
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161 Recently, a direct action against a Commission decision brought by competitors of the 
beneficiaries of a State aid measure was admitted for the first time. See Scuola Elementare 
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if it is unlawful or has not been properly notified or approved by the European 
Commission. If repayment is demanded, the taxpayer will have to reimburse 
the full amount of the financial benefit within a period of four months, including 
interest, for up to a maximum of 10 years prior to the start of an investigation. 
No recovery is necessary when the unlawful aid was paid more than 10 years 
before the European Commission’s decision.  
The European Commission has a pivotal role in the application of the state aid 
regime.162 It constantly reviews existing aids offered by Member States.163 
Furthermore, Member States are required to notify the European Commission 
as to any plans to grant or alter state aid.164 The European Commission may 
also ask the CJEU to order a Member State to recover illegal state aid.165 
In the last few years, the state aid prohibition has been used by the European 
Commission to challenge transfer pricing practices of Member States; they 
were alleged to have selectively conferred advantages on some multinationals. 
The first high-profile investigations were launched by the European 
Commission in the summer of 2014, to examine whether certain multinational 
companies had received transfer pricing tax rulings which had led to significant 
tax reductions (or no taxation at all) in violation of the state aid rules. The 
MNEs and jurisdictions involved were Apple in Ireland, Starbucks in the 
Netherlands and Fiat and Amazon in Luxembourg. Many more cases followed. 
Some cases are still being investigated by the European Commission, but other 
cases are under appeal in the CJEU after the European Commission delivered 
its decisions.  
It is beyond the scope of this article to examine the specific details of all the 
investigations. Broadly, the crux of the matter in most of the cases investigated 
was whether the tax rulings given by the relevant Member States allowed the 
MNEs to depart from market conditions in setting the commercial conditions 
(and pricing) of intra-group transactions, which led to the renunciation of tax 
revenue by Member States and as a corollary of Member State resources. The 
                                                 
Maria Montessori Srl v European Commission (CJEU, Joined cases C-622/16 P to C-624/16 P, 
6 November 2018). 
162 National courts play an equally important role in applying art 107 of the TFEU in conjunction 
with art 108(3) of the TFEU (ex-Art 88(3) EC). See Notice on Cooperation between National 
Courts and the Commission in the State Aid Field [1995] OJ C312/07, replaced by Notice on 
the Enforcement of State Aid Law by National Courts [2009] OJ C85/1. 
163 See TFEU (n 2) art 108(1). Aid may be regarded as existing aid because of Court of Justice 
case law and Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 Laying Down Detailed 
Rules for the Application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty [1999] OJ L 83/1, art 1. 
164 TFEU (n 2) art 108. 
165 See, eg, Commission v Spain (CJEU, C-184/11, 13 May 2014). 
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premise of the European Commission’s opening decisions in the initial cases 
seemed to be that the existence of advantage and selectivity was satisfied when 
the arm’s length principle of the OECD Model Tax Convention was not 
complied with.166 In later decisions, the European Commission refined its 
reasoning by finding that the impugned arrangements derogated from normal 
practices under domestic law and the arm’s length principle as encompassed 
under EU state aid rules. As stated many times in the European Commission’s 
recent decisions, ‘the arm’s-length principle therefore necessarily forms part of 
the European Commission’s assessment under article 107(1)’.167 In other 
words, the European Commission considered that the arm’s length principle 
was neither the one derived from article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, 
nor the one under domestic rules, but rather a general principle under article 
107(1) of the TFEU that prevented distortion of competition.  
At the time of writing, the CJEU has not yet delivered judgment on any of the 
cases under appeal.168 Nevertheless, on the basis of established169 and recent170 
case law in this area, it seems that, even though Member States are thought to 
have retained competence in regulating their corporate tax systems, in fact they 
are very restricted as to what type of tax incentives they can give — whether 
                                                 
166 See analysis in HJI Panayi, Advanced Issues (n 21) ch 7.  
167 See, eg, Commission Decision (EU) 2016/1699 of 11 January 2016 on the Excess Profit 
Exemption State Aid Scheme [2016] OJ L 260/61) [150]; Commission Decision (EU) 2017/502 
of 21 October 2015 on State Aid [2017] OJ L 83/38) [264]; Commission Decision (EU) 
2016/2326 of 21 October 2015 on State Aid [2016] OJ L 351/1) [228]. For commentary, see 
Ruth Bonnici, ‘The European Commission’s Arm’s Length Standard: Relationship and 
Compatibility with the Arm’s Length Principle under Transfer Pricing’ (2019) 26(1) 
International Transfer Pricing Journal 1.  
168 On 14 February 2019, the General Court annulled the Commission’s decision in the Belgian 
excess profits case (Belgium v Commission (Court of Justice of the European Union, T-131/16 
and T-263//16, 14 February 2019) as it failed to demonstrate why the selected sample was 
representative. The General Court found that a more detailed review was required. As the 
General Court did not invalidate the Commission’s substantive interpretation of the State aid 
rules, but rather challenged the methodology of assessment and the classification of the aid as 
a ‘scheme’, this ruling might not have an impact on the currently pending cases and the 
Commission’s interpretation of the arm’s length principle is still to be examined. This case has 
recently been appealed by the European Commission in Commission v Belgium and Magnetrol 
International Case C-337/19 P. See HJI Panayi, ‘European Community Tax Law’ (n 28) ch 
19[5A].  
169 See HJI Panayi, Advanced Issues (n 21) ch 7, and the case law discussed therein.  
170 See European Commission v World Duty Free Group SA (CJEU, C-20/15 P, 21 December 
2016); Asociación Nacional de Grandes Empresas de Distribución (ANGED) v Diputación 
General de Aragón (CJEU, C-236/16 and C-237/16, 21 June 2012); Commission v Spain 
(CJEU, C-128/16P, 24 November 2011); Hungary v European Commission (CJEU, Case T-
20/17, 27 June 2019). See analysis in HJI Panayi, ‘European Community Tax Law’ (n 28) ch 
19[5C].  
2019 EU CORPORATE TAX LAW 35 
through transfer pricing rulings, or advance pricing agreements, or the tax 
system as a whole. As noted earlier, basic concepts of transfer pricing, and 
especially the arm’s length principle, remain in the realm of soft law, which is 
mainly encapsulated in the OECD Model Tax Convention and the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines. The case law discussed in this Part of the article 
shows some reluctance by the CJEU to interfere with this soft law. This case 
law is, however, rather limited and based on fundamental freedoms such as the 
freedom of establishment, the theoretical underpinnings of which are very 
different. If the arm’s length principle is eventually interpreted by the CJEU as 
being encompassed in the TFEU’s state aid prohibition, this could mean that 
EU law will, in the future, have a decisive role in what is and what is not to be 
considered an arm’s length arrangement. In other words, there may well be 
significant EU interference in the transfer pricing regimes of Member States in 
the end. 
V IS THERE AN EU TAX ADMINISTRATION? 
All corporate tax systems have to be administered or at least overseen by a 
central tax authority.  
As shown in this article, the development of a body of corporate tax law in the 
European Union has been rather random and at times contradictory, the product 
of often opportunistic reactions to certain political exigencies rather than a 
carefully constructed system. Therefore, the lack of some form of central EU 
tax administration is hardly surprising. This is one of the areas that has shown 
the least progress; even in the context of the most ambitious Commission 
legislative tax proposal (the CCCTB proposal) most of the proposed 
administrative functions depend on Member State tax administrations and 
cooperation between them. The European Commission merely has an ad hoc 
role.  
A The Fragmented Landscape 
Notwithstanding the lack of a central EU tax administration, there has long 
existed EU secondary legislation which provides for Member State cooperation 
in the form of exchange of information and assistance in the collection of taxes. 
In the absence of a central tax authority to oversee compliance with this 
legislation, the correct enforcement of the rules is left to the CJEU and the 
European Commission to police (through infringement actions).171 Taxpayers 
                                                 
171 See TFEU (n 2) art 267. 
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do not tend to complain about lax enforcement of such rules, unless it favours 
a competitor.   
The pertinent rules in this area are encompassed in two directives which deal 
with the recovery of taxes172 and with exchange of information.173 As the titles 
of these instruments suggest, the Directives allow tax authorities from one 
Member State to seek assistance from another Member State. These directives 
are not exclusively relevant to companies, as they have a wide scope of 
application. In fact, initially these directives were primarily used to deal with 
emigrating individuals leaving outstanding tax bills, but nowadays they are 
increasingly relevant to companies.174 
Under the current version of the Mutual Assistance Directive for the Recovery 
of Taxes, a Member State (through its competent authority) may request 
assistance from another Member State for the recovery175 of all taxes and duties 
levied by the first Member State and all its territorial or administrative 
subdivisions.176 A Member State may also request any information which is 
foreseeably relevant to the applicant authority in the recovery of its claims.177 
Under limited circumstances, there can be an exchange of information without 
any prior request.178 The Directive also allows precautionary measures to be 
imposed by the other Member State,179 as well as providing for assistance in the 
notification of certain documents relating to claims.180 
Under the Mutual Assistance Directive for the Recovery of Taxes, assistance is 
primarily based on a prior request by one Member State to another. If the 
relevant Member States agree, officials of one Member State may be present 
                                                 
172 Mutual Assistance for the Recovery of Claims Directive (n 25).  
173 DAC (n 25).   
174 See Christiana HJI Panayi, ‘Exit Taxation as an Obstacle to Corporate Emigration from the 
Spectre of EU Tax Law’ (2011) 13 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 245, 279–
80. 
175 Mutual Assistance for the Recovery of Claims Directive (n 25) art 10.  
176 Ibid art 1. This includes a wide range of taxes, penalties, fees, interest and costs relating to 
claims. There is no recovery for compulsory social security contributions, for duties of a 
contractual nature such as consideration for public utilities, or criminal penalties imposed on 
the basis of public prosecution. 
177 Ibid art 5. 
178 Ibid art 6 which stipulates that ‘[w]here a refund of taxes or duties, other than value-added 
tax, relates to a person established or resident in another Member State, the Member State from 
which the refund is to be made may inform the Member State of establishment or residence of 
the upcoming refund’. 
179 Ibid art 16. 
180 Ibid art 8. 
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and participate in administrative enquiries, and court proceedings in the other 
Member State.181 This provision has not often been used but it is being explored 
by the Joint Transfer Pricing Forum (‘JTPF’) as far as joint audits are 
concerned.182 Broadly, however, the procedure in this Directive is very much 
governed by Member States and there is no EU institutional interference.  
There is a similar procedure for cooperation under the Mutual Assistance 
Directive on Exchange of Information which in 2011 was renamed the 
Directive on Administrative Cooperation (‘DAC’).183 The 2011 version of the 
Directive introduced an important provision for automatic exchange of 
information. Heavily influenced by the US Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
Act (‘FATCA’) legislation184 and the success of the now obsolete EU Savings 
Directive,185 it was stipulated that, from 1 January 2015, there would be 
automatic exchange of information for five types of income, namely: income 
from employment, director’s fees, life insurance products not covered by other 
directives, pensions, and ownership of and income from immovable property.186 
Whilst at the time this and other provisions187 of the new DAC were hailed as 
                                                 
181 Ibid art 7. 
182 See European Commission, EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum: Discussion Paper on Joint 
Audits for Transfer Pricing in the EU (October 2015) <https://ec.europa.eu/taxation 
_customs/sites/taxation/files/docs/body/jtpf0142015jointaudits.pdf>. See also European 
Commission, EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum: Presentation: Joint Audit Pilot Project 
Germany/the Netherlands (18 February 2016) <https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/ 
sites/taxation/files/resources/documents/taxation/company_tax/transfer_pricing/forum/jtpf/20
16/20160218_jointauditpilot.pdf>. In the context of VAT, see compromise text of the proposal 
Council Regulation (EU) 2018/1541 of 2 October 2018 Amending Regulations (EU) No 
904/2010 and (EU) 2017/2454 as regards Measures to Strengthen Administrative Cooperation 
in the Field of Value Added Tax [2018] OJ L 259/1. See generally IJJ Burgers and D Criclivaia, 
‘Joint Tax Audits: Which Countries May Benefit Most?’ (2016) 8(3) World Tax Journal 306 
and N Čičin-Šain, T Ehrke-Rabel and J Englisch, ‘Joint Audits: Applicable Law and Taxpayer 
Rights’ (2018) 10 World Tax Journal 77. 
183 DAC (n 25).   
184 FATCA was enacted as Title V of the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub L No 
111-147, §§ 501-62, 124 Stat 71. For information on the Act, see the IRS website: 
<https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/foreign-account-tax-compliance-act-fatca>.  
185 Council Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on Taxation of Savings Income in the Form of 
Interest Payments [2003] OJ L 157/38. See also Council Directive (EU) 2015/2060 of 10 
November 2015 Repealing Directive 2003/48/EC on Taxation of Savings Income in the Form 
of Interest Payments [2015] OJ L 301/1. 
186 See DAC (n 25) art 8. 
187 See, for example, the requirement for the transmission of third country information received 
by one Member State to another when this is useful under DAC art 16(3), or the requirement 
for any wider cooperation provided by a Member State to a third country to be extended to other 
Member States (the most-favoured-national clause) under DAC art 19 etc. 
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ground-breaking, by the time they became effective more amendments had 
begun to be introduced for more extensive automatic exchange of information.  
The first major amendment was agreed in 2014,188 in the midst of the 
international tax community’s frantic engagement in the OECD/G20’s BEPS 
project. This amendment introduced provisions for the automatic exchange of 
financial account information, similar to the OECD’s Common Reporting 
Standard.189  
The second amendment was agreed the following year following the revelations 
of the so-called ‘Luxembourg Leaks’190 and the launch of several European 
Commission state aid investigations into transfer pricing rulings given by 
Member States to multinationals.191 The 2015 amendment introduced a very 
bold provision for automatic exchange of information on tax rulings and 
advance pricing agreements,192 under certain conditions.193 Whilst this 
amendment may have been inspired by the recommendations of the OECD/G20 
under Action 5 of the BEPS Project194 and the subsequent elevation of these 
recommendations to the status of a minimum standard,195 the EU amendment 
went much further than this minimum standard by providing for the automatic 
rather than the spontaneous exchange of this information.  
                                                 
188 Council Directive 2014/107/EU of 9 December 2014 Amending Directive 2011/16/EU as 
Regards Mandatory Automatic Exchange of Information in the Field of Taxation [2014] OJ L 
359/1 (‘Directive 2014/107/EU’). 
189 See OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information Report 
(OECD Publishing, 2014) <http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/ 
taxation/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-financial-account-information-for-tax-
matters_9789264216525-en#page1>. 
190 On the Luxembourg Leaks, see ‘An ICU Investigation. Luxembourg Leak: Global 
Companies’ Secrets Exposed’, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (Web 
Page) <https://www.icij.org/project/luxembourg-leaks>. 
191 See HJI Panayi, Advanced Issues (n 21) ch 7. 
192 Council Directive (EU) 2015/2376 of 8 December 2015 Amending Directive 2011/16/EU as 
Regards Mandatory Automatic Exchange of Information in the Field of Taxation [2015] OJ L 
332/1 (‘Directive 2015/2376/EU’) <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/? 
uri=CELEX:32015L2376>. 
193 See HJI Panayi, ‘The Europeanisation of Good Tax Governance’ (n 102) pt III.C.IV and HJI 
Panayi, ‘European Tax Law’ (n 4) ch 18[17].  
194 Action 5 aimed to develop rules to counter harmful tax practices more effectively, taking into 
account transparency and substance. There were two important components of the 
OECD/G20’s proposals; firstly, the methodology to define the substantial activity requirement 
in the context of intangible property (the nexus approach) and, secondly, the proposed 
framework for compulsory spontaneous exchange of tax rulings.  
195 For an overview of the minimum standards, see above n 38. 
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It should be emphasised that none of the BEPS minimum standards are legally 
enforceable, not even by OECD member countries. Whilst there is political 
pressure to adopt these standards and/or amend domestic legislation 
accordingly, no sanctions are imposed if no such action is taken. Nevertheless, 
on the pretext of complying with the OECD/G20’s BEPS recommendations and 
especially the proposals for country-by-country reporting under Action 13,196 
in 2016 a third amendment to the DAC was agreed between Member States in 
Council which introduced the automatic exchange of country-by-country 
reports.197 Although, for Member States, this expedited the adoption of another 
BEPS minimum standard, again the amendment went further than the 
recommendations under Action 13. The EU legislation facilitated and enhanced 
the process of country-by-country reporting by removing the need to exchange 
such information through the more burdensome and lengthy (mostly bilateral) 
tax treaty mechanisms. In fact, there have even been calls for the information 
exchanges to be made public, though this Commission proposal198 has not (yet) 
been approved. 
The most recent amendment, agreed in 2018, introduced the automatic 
exchange of reportable cross-border tax planning arrangements in order to 
disclose potentially aggressive arrangements.199 Again, this was heavily 
                                                 
196 Under Action 13 of the Action Plan, the OECD was to: ‘Develop rules regarding transfer 
pricing documentation to enhance transparency for tax administration, taking into account the 
compliance costs for business. The rules to be developed [would] include a requirement that 
MNEs provide all relevant governments with needed information on their global allocation of 
the income, economic activity and taxes paid among countries according to a common 
template.’ See BEPS Action Plan (n 38). 
197 Council Directive (EU) 2016/881 of 25 May 2016 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards 
Mandatory Automatic Exchange of Information in the Field of Taxation [2016] OJ L 146/8 
(‘Directive 2016/881/EU’). 
198 This initiative takes the form of a proposal to amend the Accounting Directive requiring 
disclosure of financial accounts (2013/34/EU). As such, it only requires qualified majority and 
not unanimity. See Proposal for a Directive Amending Directive 2013/34/EU as Regards 
Disclosure of Income Tax Information by Certain Undertakings and Branches, COM(2016)198 
<http://www.astrid-online.it/static/upload/fcda/fcda2c1aad7cb876d19f562507d6847a.pdf>. 
Under this proposal, MNEs (EU/non-EU) with a consolidated turnover of €750 million would 
be required to publish annually a report disclosing the profit and the tax accrued and paid in 
each Member State on a country-by-country basis for EU Member States, and in the aggregate 
for all non-EU countries. The information, which is less detailed than under the currently 
approved country-by-country reporting rules, would be made available in a stand-alone report 
on the company’s website and be accessible to the public for at least 5 years. Companies would 
also have to file the report with a business register in the EU. See analysis in HJI Panayi, ‘The 
Europeanisation of Good Tax Governance’ (n 102) pt IV(A).  
199 Council Directive (EU) 2018/822 of 25 May 2018 Amending Directive 2011/16/EU as 
Regards Mandatory Automatic Exchange of Information in the Field of Taxation in Relation to 
Reportable Cross-Border Arrangements [2018] OJ L 139/1 (‘Directive 2018/822/EU’). Also 
see recently enacted Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/532 of 28 March 2019 
40 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 24 
influenced by Action 12 of the OECD/G20’s BEPS project, which, however, 
was not one of the minimum standards. 
These recent amendments have significantly enhanced and simplified 
cooperation between Member States by making the automatic exchange of 
information more mainstream. To an extent, the ‘automation’ of information 
exchanges takes away the need for a prior request from one Member State to 
another, with all its associated delays and the potential legal obstacles that could 
arise. Of course, requests could still be made in the traditional way for further 
information not included in what has been automatically exchanged. However, 
for important categories of information, the procedure for exchange has largely 
been taken outside the scope of the administrative powers of Member States.  
Whilst it cannot be said that the oversight of this procedure and the corollary 
competence has now been shifted to a Union institution, nevertheless one 
cannot but acknowledge the increasingly important role of the European 
Commission in this area. Notably, under the amendments mentioned above, 
automatically exchanged information on tax rulings and advanced pricing 
agreements and automatically exchanged information on reportable cross-
border arrangements will be stored in a central directory which is to be 
developed by the European Commission.200 Although there is not much 
information as to how these central directories will be run, what safeguards and 
                                                 
Amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2378 as regards the Standard Forms, Including 
Linguistic Arrangements, for the Mandatory Automatic Exchange of Information on Reportable 
Cross-Border Arrangements [2019] OJ L 88/25. For commentary, see Franklin Cachia, ‘Tax 
Transparency for Intermediaries: The Mandatory Disclosure Rules and Its EU Impact’ (2018) 
27(4) EC Tax Review 206–17; Roman Seer and Sascha Kargitta, ‘Exchange of Information and 
Cooperation in Direct Taxation’ in Christiana HJI Panayi et al (eds), Research Handbook in 
European Union Taxation Law (Elgar Publishing, forthcoming) ch 22 (‘Research Handbook’). 
200 Under the provisions of the Directive 2015/2376/EU (n 192), the central directory will be 
‘accessible to all Member States and the Commission, to which Member States would upload 
and store information, instead of exchanging that information by secured email’: Preamble [19]. 
The practical arrangements necessary for the establishment of such a directory are to be adopted 
by the Commission in accordance with the procedure referred to in DAC (n 25) art 26(2). 
Similarly, under the provisions of the Directive introducing automatic exchange of information 
for reportable cross-border arrangements (Directive 2018/822/EU (n 199)), the European 
Commission must develop and provide with technical and logistical support a secure Member 
State central directory. Also, implementing powers are conferred on the European Commission 
to adopt the necessary practical arrangements for upgrading the central directory. See DAC (n 
25) Preamble, para 16. No central directory seems to be foreseen for the automatic exchange of 
country-by-country information. Such information will be exchanged electronically through the 
Common Communication Network (CCN). However, under the newly added DAC art 21 para 
6 (following amendment by Directive 2016/881/EU (n 197), ‘[t]he Commission shall, by means 
of implementing acts, adopt the necessary practical arrangements for the upgrading of the CCN 
network’. 
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Chinese walls will be developed to avoid conflict of interests and how 
taxpayers’ rights will be protected, this arrangement may empower the 
European Commission to have a more strategic involvement in supra-national 
cooperation.  
The increased availability of automatic exchange of information has also fast-
tracked other forms of supra-national cooperation. Indeed, this has been the 
case with anti-money laundering rules. Through another amendment to the 
DAC,201 tax authorities now have access to beneficial ownership information 
collected under anti-money laundering legislation (namely, the fourth Anti-
Money Laundering Directive).202 This amendment follows an earlier 
proposal203 to revise the fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive to include a 
specific reference to tax crimes, as well as to require Member States to store 
beneficial ownership information in central registers which would be accessible 
to the public. Whilst the proposal for all Member States to create central 
registers of beneficial ownership information for companies, other legal 
entities, and trusts was approved, it was left to the discretion of Member States 
to decide whether to make their beneficial ownership registers public.   
Through further amendments204 to the existing anti-money laundering 
legislation, there are now extended provisions regarding the implementation 
and design of ultimate beneficial ownership registers within the EU. Very 
importantly, registers of beneficial owners of companies operating within the 
EU must now be made publicly accessible and national registers must be better 
interconnected, to facilitate cooperation between Member States. The revised 
Directive provides for extended responsibility and reporting obligations and for 
facilitated cooperation between national financial intelligence units and bank 
supervisors on the exchange of information. As for third country transactions 
which have been identified by the European Commission as presenting an 
                                                 
201 Council Directive (EU) 2016/2258 of 6 December 2016 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as 
Regards Access to Anti-Money-Laundering Information by Tax Authorities [2016] OJ L 342/1. 
202 Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on 
the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purposes of Money Laundering or 
Terrorist Financing, Amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council, and Repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC [2015] OJ L 141/73. 
203 Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing (12 January 2015) <http://data.consilium. 
europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5116-2015-ADD-2/en/pdf>.  
204 See Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 
Amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for 
the Purposes of Money Laundering or Terrorist Financing, and amending Directives 
2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU [2018] OJ L 156, 43–74. 
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increased risk of money laundering, the amended Directive provides tougher 
criteria regarding the obligation to report suspicious transactions and heavy 
sanctions against violations. 
Apart from the above forms of administrative cooperation, there is now the Tax 
Dispute Resolution Directive which aims to facilitate the resolution of disputes 
between Member States.205 The new Directive applies, inter alia, to disputes 
arising from the interpretation and application of tax treaties leading to double 
taxation. The Directive broadens the scope of the EU rules on dispute 
resolution, which hitherto were limited to the Arbitration Convention and its 
focus on transfer pricing disputes. 
More specifically, as set out in article 1, the Tax Dispute Resolution Directive 
lays down:  
rules on a mechanism to resolve disputes between Member States when those 
disputes arise from the interpretation and application of agreements and 
conventions that provide for the elimination of double taxation of income 
and, where applicable, capital.  
A combined reading of the provisions of this Directive suggests that double 
taxation may not even need to have occurred for the Directive to be applicable. 
Although the Tax Dispute Resolution Directive stipulates that a Member State 
may, on a case by case basis, deny access to the dispute resolution procedure 
where the dispute does not involve double taxation,206 the starting point is that 
even disputes not involving double taxation are within the scope of the 
Directive. This is also buttressed by the preamble to this Directive.207 Therefore, 
the new Directive not only covers disputes on double taxation but can also cover 
disputes arising from the wrongful application of any of the procedural 
provisions (for example, provisions on exchange of information, or assistance 
in the collection of taxes and so forth). 
                                                 
205 Member States had until 30 June 2019 to transpose the Directive into national laws and 
regulations. The Directive applies to complaints submitted after that date on questions relating 
to the tax year starting on or after 1 January 2018. Member States may, however, agree to apply 
the Directive to complaints related to earlier tax years. See Tax Dispute Resolution Directive (n 
27). 
206 Tax Dispute Resolution Directive (n 27) art 17(6). 
207 Ibid Preamble [6] which sets out that the resolution of disputes envisaged under the Tax 
Dispute Resolution Directive, ‘should apply to different interpretation and application of 
bilateral tax treaties and of the Union Arbitration Convention — in particular to different 
interpretation and application leading to double taxation’. 
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Under the new Tax Dispute Resolution Directive, any person who is a tax 
resident of a Member State and whose taxation is directly affected by a matter 
giving rise to a dispute, may simultaneously submit a complaint to each of the 
concerned EU competent authorities.208 Within a period of six months from 
having received all the necessary documents, any of the concerned competent 
authorities may decide to resolve the dispute on a unilateral basis. If that does 
not happen, then the relevant competent authorities of the Member States 
involved must endeavour to solve the dispute by means of a mutual agreement 
procedure within a period of two years.209 Any agreement reached under the 
mutual agreement procedure is binding on the competent authorities and 
enforceable by the taxpayer.210  
If no agreement is reached, then, upon a request by the taxpayer to the 
competent authorities of the Member States concerned, an Advisory 
Commission is set up.211 The new Directive provides for mandatory resolution 
of double taxation disputes. Alternatively, Member States are able to request an 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Commission to be set up instead of the 
Advisory Commission, which will also deal with the dispute in a binding 
manner.212 Taxpayers have several appeal possibilities to ensure that the 
competent authorities will apply the provisions of the Tax Dispute Resolution 
Directive. 
The new Directive sets out when access to national courts should be granted for 
the purpose of clarifying whether there is an obligation to eliminate double 
taxation. If there is such an obligation, the Tax Dispute Resolution Directive 
provides the national court with the power to take action.213 Furthermore, the 
new Tax Dispute Resolution Directive allows Member States to choose the 
methods for solving their double taxation disputes provided that double taxation 
is eliminated within the timeframes laid down in the Directive. In addition, the 
Tax Dispute Resolution Directive allows the European Commission to assist 
Member States in the proceedings and increases transparency by requiring at 
least the abstracts of the decisions to be published. The European Commission 
is, once again, tasked with the development of a central repository which will 
archive the opinions of the Advisory Commissions and of the Alternative 
                                                 
208 This right must be exercised within three years from the receipt of the first notification of the 
action resulting in, or that will result in, the dispute: ibid art 3. 
209 Ibid art 4(1). 
210 Ibid art 4(2). 
211 Ibid art 6. The relevant competent authorities must also inform the taxpayer of the reasons 
that no agreement was reached: art 4(3). 
212 Ibid art 10. 
213 Ibid art 16. 
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Dispute Resolution Commissions (either the final decisions or the abstracts) 
and make them available online.214 
The processes discussed above are still largely supra-national and dependent on 
cooperation between Member States, albeit embedded in the normative and 
much more easily enforceable context of EU law. Nevertheless, one can easily 
detect the European Commission’s enhanced involvement which could lead to 
creeping competences. The central directories which are to be developed by the 
European Commission following the amendments to the DAC, and the central 
repository of opinions under the new Tax Dispute Resolution Directive are a 
starting point. Such central directories/repositories could eventually lead to the 
allocation of more centralised administrative functions to the European 
Commission, not just in the area of information exchange but in other aspects 
of tax administration. 
Acquiring a more important role in the EU’s tax administration may not be such 
a big leap for the European Commission. As shown in Part IV, the European 
Commission already has important centralised functions in the context of the 
state aid regime, including fiscal state aid. More specifically, the European 
Commission is the only EU institution that can launch state aid investigations 
and deliver the first instance decisions which, if not appealed in the European 
courts, are final and binding on Member States. The European Commission also 
develops guidelines and other types of soft law in this area.215 The recent 
Commission investigations into Member States’ transfer pricing tax rulings 
show just how much power the European Commission wields in this area. Of 
course, the ultimate arbiter in this and many other areas is the CJEU. 
Nevertheless, as the investigations are launched and pursued by the European 
Commission in a largely discretionary manner,216 the European Commission 
arguably has a significant role in determining what aid may and may not to be 
scrutinised at EU level.  
Other older and more recent initiatives also seem to buttress the growing 
importance of the European Commission as an ad hoc EU tax administration. 
In the early 2000s, the European Commission negotiated on behalf of the Union 
                                                 
214 Ibid art 19. 
215 See generally, ‘State Aid Control’ European Commission (Web Page) <http://ec.europa.eu/ 
competition/state_aid/overview/index_en.html>.  
216 The European Commission has substantial discretion in the overall process as it is entitled to 
set priorities in relation to state aid complaints and give differing degrees of priority. The 
procedure is essentially a bilateral one between the European Commission and the Member 
State that has conferred the aid. There are no material procedural rights conferred to interested 
parties — whether the beneficiary of the aid or the competitor.  
2019 EU CORPORATE TAX LAW 45 
the EU savings taxation agreements with some non-EU European countries, 
namely: Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and Switzerland.217 
These agreements were considered to be necessary to enable the Union to 
exercise its internal competence, though it was emphasised that the Union did 
not have exclusive competence218 to conclude such agreements.219 Similar 
bilateral savings taxation agreements were also signed with the dependent 
territories of the Netherlands and the UK (Anguilla, Aruba, the British Virgin 
Islands, the Cayman Islands, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Jersey, Montserrat, the 
Netherlands Antilles and the Turks and Caicos Islands), and other European 
countries (Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and Switzerland). 
More recently, the European Commission was entrusted with the revision of 
these agreements in order to align the regulatory framework of these European 
countries with that introduced under the 2014 amendment220 to the DAC,221 
discussed above.   
Perhaps the most obvious example of the European Commission acting as a 
central tax authority is in the context of developing the EU’s external fiscal 
policy and more specifically in the creation of the EU list of non-cooperative 
tax jurisdictions. For such initiatives, it tends to be assisted by other informal 
(and unelected) bodies, which also seem to wield substantial power. This is 
discussed next. 
                                                 
217 See generally Christiana HJI Panayi, ‘The Relationship between EU and International Tax 
Law’ in HJI Panayi, Research Handbook (n 199). 
218 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision on the Conclusion of the 
Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation Providing for 
Measures Equivalent to Those Laid Down in Council Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on 
Taxation of Savings Income in the Form of Interest Payments and the Accompanying 
Memorandum of Understanding, COM (2004) 75 final, 3. 
219 Interestingly, about 20 years earlier, in 1983, the European Commission had unsuccessfully 
claimed competence to negotiate a multilateral agreement on exchange of information with the 
Council of Europe, and failed to obtain a mandate due to the concerns of the Member States. 
See Recommendation for a Council Decision Authorizing the Commission to Negotiate a 
Multilateral Convention on Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters within the Council of 
Europe, COM (83) 685 final, 22 November 1983. This recommendation was subsequently 
withdrawn on 13 April 1988. 
220 Directive 2014/107/EU (n 188). 
221 For the current status of these updated agreements, see ‘International Developments’, 
European Commission (Web Page) <https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/individuals/ 
personal-taxation/taxation-savings-income/international-developments_en>.  
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B Is There Centralisation of Soft Law Fiscal Powers? 
Whilst there is no official central tax authority for EU tax matters, some 
unifying and increasingly empowering soft law is generated from the European 
Commission or expert groups such as the Joint Transfer Pricing Forum, the 
VAT Group and the Platform for Tax Good Governance. These groups 
comprise experts from Member State tax authorities, the business sector and 
NGOs appointed by the European Commission to assist and advise it in the 
underlying areas.222  
As discussed in Part IV, the Joint Transfer Pricing Forum has produced 
extensive guidance on transfer pricing issues.223 Some of this guidance even 
influenced the recommendations produced under the OECD/G20’s BEPS 
project. For example, on the basis of the work of the Joint Transfer Pricing 
Forum, in 2011, the European Commission published a Communication setting 
out guidelines on transfer pricing issues related to low-value-adding intra-group 
services and non-EU triangular services.224 The influence of this 
Communication on the OECD/G20’s recommendations on low value-adding 
intra-group services225 is obvious. The Joint Transfer Pricing Forum’s work has 
also been pioneering as far as country-by-country reporting is concerned. In 
2006, again as a result of the work of the Forum, a Code of Conduct on the 
transfer pricing documentation for associated enterprises in the EU was 
                                                 
222 The Tax Policy Group and the Recovery Committee are other advisory groups listed on the 
Commission’s website but there is not much information as to the composition and functioning 
of this group. The Expert Group on Taxation of Digital Economy is also still listed, even though 
it does not appear to have been active since 2014. See ‘Further Reading’, European Commission 
(Web Page) <https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/fight-against-tax-fraud-tax-evasion/ 
further-reading_en>.  
223 See above n 142.  
224 European Commission, Communication Setting Out 1. Guidelines on Technical Issues Related 
to Transfer Pricing Taxation, including Low-Value-Adding Intra-Group Services and 2. 
Potential Approaches to Non-EU Triangular Services (COM(2011)16 final) <https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0016&from=EN>. See 
also Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on the Communication from the 
Commission on the Work of the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum in the Period April 2009 to 
June 2010 and Related Proposals: 1. Guidelines on Low Value Adding Intra-Group Services 
and 2. Potential Approaches to Non-EU Triangular Cases’ (Press Release, 17 May 2011) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/docs/body/council_conclusions_jtp
f.pdf>. 
225 OECD, Public Discussion Draft – BEPS Action 10: Proposed Modifications to Chapter VII 
of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines relating to Low Value-Adding Intra-Group Services 3 
November 2014–14 January 2015 (3 November 2014) <http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-
pricing/discussion-draft-action-10-low-value-adding-intra-group-services.pdf>. 
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published.226 The Code of Conduct provided a template for standardised and 
partially centralised transfer pricing documentation for associated enterprises 
in the EU. It was addressed to Member States but was also intended to 
encourage MNEs to apply the standardised approach. Member States were 
urged to accept the standardised documentation and consider it as a basic set of 
information for the assessment of an MNE’s transfer prices. The use of 
standardised documentation was optional but it provided an incentive to 
minimise the administrative costs of complying with several national transfer 
pricing documentation requirements. Country-by-country reporting was a 
major theme of the BEPS project and eventually became one of the minimum 
standards. 
Many recent tax initiatives or legislative proposals either originated or were 
discussed in the context of the Platform for Tax Good Governance. Through 
several discussion papers, the Platform has considered issues such as whether 
to adopt a general anti-abuse rule in the context of the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive, what criteria should be applied by Member States to establish lists of 
non-cooperative jurisdictions, how to improve dispute resolution, how to 
implement mandatory disclosure for some aggressive tax arrangements, the 
external strategy for effective taxation, the protection of whistle-blowers, the 
taxation of digital economy and much more.227 
The EU Code of Conduct Group is another informal body created in 1998228 to 
help implement the Code of Conduct for business taxation229 in order to tackle 
harmful tax competition at the time. The Code of Conduct Group is an 
unelected informal body, composed of high-level officials of Member States 
but also reliant on the general secretariat of the Council of the EU. It does not 
take any formal decisions but its recommendations have great political weight. 
The work of the Group is confidential and focuses on legislator behaviour rather 
                                                 
226 See Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States, Meeting within the Council, of 27 June 2006 on a Code of Conduct on Transfer Pricing 
Documentation for Associated Enterprises in the European Union, [2006] OJ C 176/1 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:42006X0728%2801%29>.  
227 ‘Platform for Tax Good Governance’ European Commission (Web Page) <https://ec. 
europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/tax-good-governance/platform-tax-good-
governance_en>.  
228 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions of 9 March 1998 Concerning the 
Establishment of the Code of Conduct Group for Business Taxation [1998] OJ C 99/1. 
229 EU Code of Conduct (1997): Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1 December 
1997 Concerning Taxation Policy [1997] OJ C 2/1. This Code of Conduct had been adopted by 
the Council the previous year, in the context of the EU’s fight against harmful tax competition. 
See European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council — Towards 
Tax Co-ordination in the European Union, A Package to Tackle Harmful Tax Competition 
COM(97) 495 final, 1 October1997. 
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than taxpayer behaviour.230 When the Code of Conduct Group was first 
established, it was asked to assess whether or not certain Member State tax rules 
could be considered harmful tax practices — an exercise similar to that 
undertaken by the OECD in the context of its Harmful Tax Competition project 
in 1998.231 Its work in this area has been very successful232 and the Code of 
Conduct Group continues to monitor potentially harmful tax measures.233  
It is notable that the Code of Conduct on Business Taxation contains provisions 
which go beyond the initial concern of harmful tax competition. For example, 
paragraphs K and L of the Code promote action to curb tax avoidance and 
evasion. Paragraph M of the Code also focuses on the geographical extension 
of the rules on harmful tax competition and the policy towards third countries. 
When the Code was first introduced, it was considered essential that it should 
apply to as broad a geographical area as possible. On this basis, Member States 
with dependent or associated territories were urged to ensure that the principles 
of the Code applied to those territories. 
These paragraphs have enabled the Code of Conduct Group to expand its work 
into several areas dealing with administrative practices (for example, cross-
border rulings) and anti-abuse mechanisms (for example, hybrid instruments, 
hybrid entities and hybrid permanent establishments, hybrid permanent 
establishments and third countries and so forth.234 Third-country issues have 
                                                 
230 Martijn Nouwen, ‘The Gathering Momentum of International and Supranational Action 
against Aggressive Tax Planning and Harmful Tax Competition: The State of Play of Recent 
Work of the OECD and European Union’ (2013) 53(10) European Taxation 9. Also see Vinod 
Kalloe, ‘EU Code of Conduct: From Reviewing Individual Tax Regimes to Developing 
Horizontal Policy: Cracking the Code in the BEPS Era’ (2016) 56(5) European Taxation 183. 
231 OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (OECD Publications, 1998). 
232 The first report of the Code of Conduct Group (also known as the Primarolo Report) listed 66 
preferential tax measures that had been found to be harmful. The Primarolo Report also listed 
six categories of harmful tax measures relating to insurance practices, financial services, 
transfer pricing, holding company regimes, exempt and offshore entities. Interim draft reports 
were published in 1998. Since then, and after the publication of various guidelines, the Member 
States and the associated/dependent territories concerned have largely dismantled these 
measures.  
233 See the various reports of the Code of Conduct Group to Council since 1999, available at: 
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/register/en/content/out?DOC_TITLE=business%20taxatio
n&ORDERBY=DOC_DATE%20DESC&DOC_LANCD=EN&RESULTSET=1&DOC_SUB
TYPE=%22REPORT%22&i=COCGRTTC&ROWSPP=25&typ=SET&NRROWS=500&TA
RGET_YEAR=2019>.   
234 See HJI Panayi, Advanced Issues (n 21) ch 5, pt 5.6; Kalloe (n 230) 186–7, and references 
therein. For the more recent guidance on hybrid PEs and third countries, see Code of Conduct 
Group (Business Taxation), Code of Conduct (Business Taxation) − Report to the Council 
(Report, doc 9912/16, Council of the European Union, 13 June 2016) <http://data. 
consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9912-2016-INIT/en/pdf>. See also Elizabeth Gil 
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also been addressed in the context of the dialogue between the EU and non-EU 
countries — especially Liechtenstein and Switzerland — on the application of 
the principles and the criteria contained in the Code of Conduct on Business 
Taxation.235  
Recently, some ground-breaking synergies appear to be resulting from the 
unofficial cooperation/coordination between the European Commission, the 
Commission-appointed expert groups and the Code of Conduct Group. The best 
example of these is the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, which is 
proving to be very influential in the development of a common fiscal policy 
externally. The EU list was spearheaded by the European Commission in the 
context of its work on a common external fiscal strategy, assisted by the 
Platform for Tax Good Governance. The role of the Code of Conduct Group in 
assessing and monitoring countries for the purposes of this list was also 
decisive. The overall implementation of this project, which is ongoing, relies 
heavily on the European Commission and the Code of Conduct Group.  
The first steps towards developing a uniform approach to non-cooperative (non-
EU) tax jurisdictions were taken with the European Commission’s Action Plan 
for a Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in June 2015.236 In the context of 
this Action Plan, the European Commission published a first pan-EU online 
map of third-country non-cooperative tax jurisdictions. This was a map of non-
EU tax jurisdictions which Member States had considered uncooperative under 
their own systems. In other words, initially, the European Commission used 
Member States’ benchmarks for noncompliance and not its own. There were 
about 30 non-EU tax jurisdictions in the first version of the map.237 The map 
was to be updated periodically and used to develop a common EU strategy to 
deal with such jurisdictions, including via coordinated countermeasures.  
                                                 
Garcia, ‘Addressing Hybrid PE Mismatches: The Guidance of the Code of Conduct Group’ 
(2017) 57(2/3) European Taxation 94. 
235 For a compilation of the Guidance Notes agreed by the Code of Conduct Group (Business 
Taxation) since its creation in March 1998, see General Secretariat of the Council, Agreed 
Guidance by the Code of Conduct Group (Business Taxation): 1998–2018 (Report, doc 
5814/3/18 Rev 3, Council of the European Union, 13 July 2018) <http://data. 
consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5814-2018-REV-3/en/pdf>.  
236 See n 41.  
237 Obviously, the first version has been replaced by later versions. The map is no longer available 
online as it has been superseded by the EU list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions. See 
‘Common EU List of Third Country Jurisdictions for Tax Purposes’, European Commission 
(Web Page) <https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/tax-good-govern 
ance/tax-good-governance-world-seen-eu-countries_en>.  
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Indeed, in its Communication on External Strategy,238 the European 
Commission devised the steps to be taken in order to develop a common 
strategy. As a first step, the European Commission would identify the third 
countries that should be prioritised for screening, according to its key 
indicators. The results of this so-called scoreboard approach were published by 
the European Commission in September 2016.239 As a second step, Member 
States would decide which jurisdictions should be assessed on the basis of 
criteria agreed between them. Again, the European Commission exerted 
important influence on the criteria that were eventually approved by ECOFIN 
in November 2016240 and used in the subsequent screening process by the Code 
of Conduct Group. The screening process was coordinated with the Council’s 
High Level Working Party on Taxation, and heavily supported and guided by 
the European Commission. The process was completed by September 2017 and 
Member States were called to endorse the list of non-cooperative jurisdictions. 
The third step was Member State (that is, ECOFIN) approval of the final EU 
list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, which effectively rubber-stamped the 
European Commission’s work in this area. The EU list (also colloquially called 
the EU blacklist) was approved by ECOFIN in December 2017. Seventeen 
countries241 were identified as failing to meet the agreed criteria, and 47 
countries were identified as having committed to addressing deficiencies in 
their tax systems and to meeting the required criteria.242 The European 
                                                 
238 External Strategy Communication (n 109) 11.  
239 ‘First Step towards a New EU List of Third Country Jurisdictions — Scoreboard’ European 
Commission (Web Page, September 2016) <https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/ 
taxation/files/2016-09-15_scoreboard-indicators.pdf#page=1&zoom=auto,-20,842>. 
240 General Secretariat of the Council, ‘Criteria and Process Leading to the Establishment of the 
EU List of Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions for Tax Purposes — Council Conclusions’ (Report, 
doc 14166/16, Council of the European Union, 8 November 2016) <http://www.consilium. 
europa.eu/media/24230/08-ecofin-non-coop-juris-st14166en16.pdf>. Effectively, ECOFIN 
adopted the Commission recommendations (see main recommendations and Annex I of the 
Commission Communication on External Strategy (n 109)) and set out the following criteria to 
be used to assess countries for the purposes of the EU listing process: tax transparency, fair 
taxation and BEPS implementation (of the minimum standards). See also analysis in HJI 
Panayi, ‘The Europeanisation of Good Tax Governance’ (n 102) pt IV(C). 
241 The 17 jurisdictions on the list were the following: American Samoa, Bahrain, Barbados, 
Grenada, Guam, Korea, Macao, Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Namibia, Palau, Panama, Saint 
Lucia, Samoa, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates. Georgia has also been 
listed by mistake and removed the following day. 
242 The European Commission excluded 48 least developed countries from the pre-assessment 
and delayed the screening for jurisdictions of the Caribbean area (Anguilla, Antigua and 
Barbuda, Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Turks and Caicos 
Islands and US Virgin Islands) due to the natural disaster that affected the region in September 
2017.  
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Commission encouraged Member States to agree on coordinated sanctions 
against the listed jurisdictions, such as increased monitoring and audits, the 
withholding of taxes, the imposition of special documentation requirements and 
of anti-abuse provisions.  
Following this ground-breaking development, several more countries were 
removed from or added to the EU list. Later on, ECOFIN published a 
consolidated list, together with a consolidated version of the state of play.243 
Soon thereafter, the European Commission published guidelines244 on the use 
of EU funds in order to ensure that such funds are not channelled or transited 
through entities that are resident in blacklisted tax jurisdictions. This was 
largely expected, given the warnings published in the European Commission’s 
Q&A fact sheet accompanying the first version of the EU list.245 Following the 
European Commission’s guidelines, funding by International Financial 
Institutions such as the European Investment Bank and the various 
Development Financial Institutions can no longer be channelled through listed 
jurisdictions.246 The guidelines also provide information on how implementing 
partners should assess projects that involve entities in listed jurisdictions.247  
                                                 
243 See General Secretariat of the Council, ‘The EU List of Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions for 
Tax Purposes — State of Play of the Cooperation with the EU with respect to Commitments 
Taken to Implement Tax Good Governance Principles’ (Report, doc 6236/1/18 Rev 1, Council 
of the European Union, 19 March 2018) <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-
6236-2018-REV-1/en/pdf>.  
244 See European Commission, Communication on New Requirements against Tax Avoidance in 
EU Legislation Governing in Particular Financing and Investment Operations, C(2018) 1756 
final, Brussels, 21.3.2018 <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-finance/c_2018_ 
1756_en_0.pdf>. 
245 This was also released on 5 December 2017: European Commission, ‘Questions and Answers 
on the EU List of Non-Cooperative Tax Jurisdictions’ (Fact Sheet, 5 December 2017) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-5122_en.htm>.  
246 Standardised wording referring to the adoption of the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions 
has already been inserted into various EU legal acts, such as Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 September 2017 (establishing the European Fund 
for Sustainable Development (EFSD), the EFSD Guarantee and the EFSD Guarantee Fund) 
[2017] OJ L 249/1 (establishing the European Fund for Sustainable Development) and 
Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 June 2015 on 
the European Fund for Strategic Investments, the European Investment Advisory Hub and the 
European Investment Project Portal and amending Regulations (EU) No 1291/2013 and (EU) 
No 1316/2013 — The European Fund for Strategic Investments [2015] OJ L 169 (establishing 
the European Fund for Strategic Investments).  
247 Implementing Partners are entities implementing EU funds under indirect management 
(generally international financial institutions and development financial institutions). 
Implementing Partners have to perform tax avoidance checks on all relevant entities involved 
in a project, as well as align their internal policies with the EU’s policy on non-cooperative 
jurisdictions for tax purposes. Although Implementing Partners are invited to review their 
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At the time of writing, the last update of this list took place at the June 2019 
ECOFIN meeting. By that time, following the Code of Conduct Group’s 
recommendations, 10 more jurisdictions were added to the list for failing to 
comply with commitments by the agreed deadlines, namely: Aruba, Barbados, 
Belize, Bermuda, Dominica, Fiji, the Marshall Islands, Oman, the United Arab 
Emirates and Vanuatu.248 In May 2019, Bermuda, Aruba, and Barbados were 
again removed from the EU list. At the June ECOFIN meeting249 it was 
decided to remove Dominica from the list, which now includes the following 
11 jurisdictions: American Samoa, Belize, Fiji, Guam, the Marshall Islands, 
Oman, Samoa, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Arab Emirates, the US Virgin 
Islands, and Vanuatu. 
This whole process has been criticised for the lack of transparency in selecting 
the criteria for listing or delisting countries and the possible sanctions. It has 
also been criticised for the fact that EU Member States were not considered for 
assessment.250 Although, in February 2018, the Code of Conduct Group 
published the letters seeking commitments from the non-cooperative 
jurisdictions,251 this was still not considered to be satisfactory. The lack of 
transparency during the listing/delisting process and the lack of credibility of 
                                                 
existing portfolio with respect to EU policy, the EU blacklist only applies to new and renewed 
operations. 
248 See General Secretariat of the Council, ‘The Revised EU List of Non-Cooperative 
Jurisdictions for Tax Purposes — Council Conclusions’, Council of the European Union 
(Report, doc 7441/19, 12 March 2019) <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/38450 
/st07441-en19-eu-list-oop.pdf>.  
249 See June 2019 ECOFIN note on changes to the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, 
Council of the European Union, Report by the Code of Conduct Group (Business Taxation) 
suggesting amendments to the Annexes of the Council conclusions of 12 March 2019, including 
the de-listing of one jurisdiction (6 June 2019) <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/ 
document/ST-9674-2019-REV-1/en/pdf>.  
250 Indicatively, shortly before the release of the EU list, Oxfam published its own research on 
tax havens, based on the Commission’s screening criteria. More specifically, Oxfam applied 
these criteria to all the countries being screened by the Commission, as well as to all the Member 
States. According to the results of Oxfam’s analysis, a robust application of the Commission’s 
criteria would lead to at least 35 non-EU countries to be included in the EU list. Oxfam also 
found that four Member States (Ireland, Malta, Netherlands and Luxembourg) would likely fail 
the Commission’s criteria. See Aurore Chardonnet and Johan Langerock, ‘Blacklist or 
Whitewash? What a Real EU Blacklist of Tax Havens Should Look Like’, Oxfam International 
(Oxfam Briefing Note, 27 November 2017) <https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/blacklist-or-
whitewash-what-real-eu-blacklist-tax-havens-should-look>.  
251 See General Secretariat of the Council, ‘The EU List of Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions for 
Tax Purposes. Compilation of Letters Seeking Commitment’ (Report, doc 6671/18, Council of 
the European Union, 6 March 2018) <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6671-
2018-INIT/en/pdf>.  
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the resulting blacklist have also been discussed in the European Parliament252 
but without resulting in any changes. Although the Austrian Presidency of the 
EU has reportedly considered whether Member States should also be subject to 
the review process conducted by the Code of Conduct Group for the purposes 
of the blacklist,253 no concrete steps have yet been taken to that effect.254  
Putting aside the problematic nature of this blacklist, what is remarkable is how 
the European Commission, assisted by other informal and unelected bodies, is 
slowly acquiring some functions of a tax administration in this area and is doing 
so with the tacit approval of Member States. At least insofar as the EU list of 
non-cooperative jurisdictions is concerned, not only did the European 
Commission design and subsequently hijack the whole process (with debatable 
competence to do so),255 but it is also involved in the development of common 
sanctions which could go some way towards replicating important functions of 
a national tax authority.  
VI THE PERIPATETIC NATURE OF EU CORPORATE TAX 
LAW AND BREXIT 
This article has reviewed some aspects of the EU’s tax set-up which correspond 
to aspects of a country’s corporate tax regime. The article began by explaining 
the difficulties and constraints in developing a coherent and uniform body of 
corporate tax legislation, due to the constitutional requirement of unanimity in 
decision-making among Member States. The result is a patchwork of hard law 
and soft law, which has been created mostly on an ad hoc basis and often as a 
reaction to other international developments or EU milestones. What could 
broadly be perceived as EU corporate tax law has been scrutinised in the context 
of the following topics: the existence of a uniform tax base and tax rates, the 
                                                 
252 See European Parliament, Parliamentary Debates, Brussels, 28 February 2018 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20180228 
+ITEM-025+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN>.  
253 See Francesco Guarascio, ‘EU Weighs Screening Member States over Tax Avoidance — 
Official’, Reuters (Web Page, 10 October, 2018) <https://www.reuters.com/article/eu-tax-
avoidance/eu-weighs-screening-member-states-over-tax-avoidance-official-idUSL8N1 
WQ4VB>.  
254 This was implicitly recommended in the TAXE 3 European Parliament committee report, 
where it was stated that some Member States functioned as corporate tax havens. See European 
Parliament, Report on Financial Crimes, Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance. European 
Parliament Resolution of 26 March 2019 on Financial Crimes, Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance 
(2018/2121(INI)) (Report, doc P8_TA-PROV(2019)0240, European Parliament. 26 March 
2019) [330] <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/162244/P8_TA-PROV(2019)0240. 
pdf>.   
255 For criticism, see HJI Panayi, ‘The Europeanisation of Good Tax Governance’ (n 102). 
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existence of anti-abuse rules and transfer pricing rules and, finally, the existence 
of a common tax administration.  
It has been shown that, whilst there is currently neither a uniform (EU) tax base 
nor a uniform tax rate, several legislative proposals are in the pipeline which 
seek to change this situation to some extent. This article has reviewed the 
pending CCTB and CCCTB Directives, which aim to provide common rules 
for a corporate tax base and, more innovatively, for cross-border consolidation. 
Although the foundations of these draft Directives are older European 
Commission proposals which were never approved, the fact that, in the new 
proposals, the issues of the common tax base and cross-border consolidation 
are addressed separately increases the likelihood of at least one of them being 
unanimously approved by Member States. Furthermore, the fact that, under the 
new proposals, the attention has shifted from the objective of facilitating 
corporate groupings and simplifying tax compliance to the objective of 
countering tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning also increases this 
likelihood.   
This article has also reviewed the embattled proposal for the FTT, which 
provides for a common tax levy (that is, a common tax rate) on certain 
transactions. The strong disagreements with this proposal, and the fate of the 
subsequently modified proposal, to be applied by a few Member States only on 
the basis of enhanced cooperation, are indicative of the overall dynamics and 
challenges faced in this area.  
More recent proposals for taxing the digital economy have also been 
considered. These proposals have an impact both on the corporate tax base and 
the tax rate imposed by Member States. For example, the proposal for a ‘digital 
permanent establishment’ concept based on significant digital presence 
interferes with the discretion of Member States to define the boundaries of what 
they consider a permanent establishment for the purposes of exercising their 
taxing powers. It therefore represents an important erosion of their tax 
sovereignty. Furthermore, the digital permanent establishment concept goes 
beyond the definition found in the OECD Model Tax Convention256 which most 
Member States follow, thus potentially interfering with the traditional 
allocation of taxing rights that is adopted in tax treaties with third countries. 
The second proposal introduces a digital services tax of 3% on revenues 
resulting from the provision of certain digital services.257 This imposition of 
                                                 
256 See OECD Model Tax Convention (n 10) art 5. 
257 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the Common System of a Digital 
Services Tax on Revenues Resulting from the Provision of Certain Digital Services, 
COM(2018) 148 final, 21 March 2018. 
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what seems to be a direct tax,258 however small, on certain types of activities is 
an undeniable encroachment on the powers of Member States to determine the 
scope of their tax bases and their corporate tax rates. Furthermore, the huge 
shift in taxation rights based on the location of the digital user in value creation, 
if applied unilaterally by the EU, might be difficult to enforce and would harm 
international cooperation. Strong concerns about this have already been voiced 
by the US government.259 It would also potentially harm the competitiveness of 
the EU and its ability to attract digital businesses (whether start-ups or 
established businesses).   
The article has also examined one of the most paradoxical developments in this 
area: the adoption of uniform anti-abuse rules under the ATAD, in the absence 
of a comprehensively harmonised corporate tax system. It has been shown that 
these rules, combined with the ad hoc anti-abuse rules in some of the corporate 
tax directives and the often contradictory principles derived from the case law 
of the CJEU, are jeopardising legal certainty and undermining future efforts to 
create a more streamlined EU corporate tax system. The treatment of basic 
transfer pricing concepts such as the arm’s length principle under soft law and 
hard law (that is, the case law of the CJEU on the basis of fundamental freedoms 
and the state aid prohibition) shows the extent to which there is uncoordinated 
and, arguably, ‘erratic’ EU interference in this area.  
It has been shown in this article that the area where there has been least 
coordination and harmonisation is that of tax administration. It would seem that 
tax administration functions, such as cross-border cooperation and the 
exchange of information amongst Member States, are largely decentralised and 
governed by Member State competent authorities. The same model of 
governance even seems to be replicated in the proposed CCTB/CCCTB 
Directives.260 Only as regards the development of an external fiscal policy does 
there appear to be a gravitational pull towards centralising administrative 
                                                 
258 Interestingly, an EU Council opinion concluded that the appropriate legal basis for the tax 
should be art 115 and not art 113 of the TFEU, on the basis of which the proposal was made: 
Council of the European Union, ‘Opinion of the Legal Service’ 2018/0073(CNS) (8 October 
2018) <https://dlbjbjzgnk95t.cloudfront.net/1091000/1091097/dst%20opinion.pdf>. 
259 See, for example, US Treasury Secretary Steven T Mnuchin’s statement regarding digital tax 
proposals, released on 25 October 2018: ‘I highlight again our strong concern with countries’ 
consideration of a unilateral and unfair gross sales tax that targets our technology and internet 
companies. A tax should be based on income, not sales, and should not single out a specific 
industry for taxation under a different standard. We urge our partners to finish the OECD 
process with us rather than taking unilateral action in this area’: US Department of the Treasury, 
‘Secretary Mnuchin Statement on Digital Economy Taxation Efforts’ (25 October 2018) 
<https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm534>.  
260 See Draft CCCTB Directive (n 44) ch IX. 
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functions in the hands of the European Commission, as assisted by the Code of 
Conduct Group and informal bodies of experts. What is unfortunate is that any 
plans for reform in this area, however ambitious or modest, do not address the 
growing administrative powers and vague obligations of the European 
Commission and the lack of institutional checks and balances.   
It is questionable whether this welter of conflicting principles which result from 
the peripatetic nature of EU corporate tax law is suitable for a Union which 
aspires to have one of the most competitive economies in the world. Arguably, 
this patchwork of rules and principles undercuts the Union’s potential for 
growth and development. Whilst case law imposes strict proportional and 
substance-related thresholds for any national anti-abuse rules, secondary 
legislation does not seem to follow those strict thresholds. Similarly, whilst de 
minimis secondary legislation provides relief for double taxation of passive 
investment or facilitates cross-border reorganisations (under very strict 
conditions), at the same time more general case law either provides more 
generous treatment to taxpayers or draws unintelligible distinctions and makes 
unpredictable exceptions.261 Furthermore, whilst a growing body of legislation 
facilitates the cross-border exchange of information and assistance in the 
recovery of taxes, there is no central tax administration overseeing the 
effectiveness of the rules and compliance with them. Not only that, but within 
the EU there seems to be a momentum towards a common external fiscal 
strategy with significant consequences — namely, sanctions against non-
compliant third countries — despite the EU having no real competence to 
impose such sanctions. In fact, the institutions and other unofficial actors 
involved in many of these developments are accused of arbitrariness, bias in 
favour of Member States and lack of transparency in their workings and 
deliberations. All of the above potentially undermine the attractiveness of the 
EU as a good corporate tax destination. 
At the time of writing, from a purely legalistic perspective, Brexit does not 
appear to have an immediate impact on the above analysis. In fact, the status 
quo is likely to be perpetuated vis-à-vis the UK. Under the draft Withdrawal 
Agreement between the UK and the EU,262 whose ratification by the UK 
                                                 
261 This area was not examined in this paper. For more information, see HJI Panayi, ‘European 
Community Tax Law’ (n 28) ch 19 [11]–[12]. 
262 See European Commission, Draft Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy 
Community, as Agreed at Negotiators’ Level on 14 November 2018 (Web Page, 14 November 
2018) (‘Withdrawal Agreement’) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/draft-
agreement-withdrawal-united-kingdom-great-britain-and-northern-ireland-european-union-
and-european-atomic-energy-community-agreed-negotiators-level-14-november-2018_en>. 
For an overview of the issues, see European Commission, Brexit Negotiations: What is in the 
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Parliament in its current form is most unlikely,263 the UK will be treated during 
a transition period264 as if it is still part of the EU, but without any involvement 
in the EU institutions and governance. Therefore, the UK will continue to be 
bound by EU law, including whatever has been described in this article as being 
encompassed within the scope of EU corporate tax law. The CJEU will also 
continue to have jurisdiction during this period.265  
Even after the transition period has ended, under the Withdrawal Agreement, 
the UK will be bound to continue to apply the provisions of the DAC266 and of 
the ATAD267 as applicable at the end of the transition period. In other words, 
any further amendments to these Directives made in the transition period, 
during which the UK will have no vote and no right to object, will also be 
binding on it. Similarly, the UK will also be bound by the Code of Conduct on 
Business Taxation and all guidance as applicable at that point in time.268 
Crucially, the draft Withdrawal Agreement commits the UK to good 
governance in the tax area, which includes, ‘the global standards on 
transparency and exchange of information, fair taxation, and the OECD 
standards against Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)’.269 The preceding 
Political Declaration contains similar provisions.270 The EU and the UK are 
                                                 
Withdrawal Agreement (Fact Sheet, 14 November 2018) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-18-6422_en.htm>. See also European Commission, Outline of the Political 
Declaration Setting Out the Framework for the Future Relationship between the European 
Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as Agreed at 
Negotiators' Level on 14 November 2018 (Web Page, 14 November 2018) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/files/outline-political-declaration-setting-framework-future-
relationship-between-european-union-and-united-kingdom-great-britain-and-northern-ireland-
agreed-negotiators-level-14-november-2018_en>.  
263 At the time of writing, the UK Parliament has rejected the draft Withdrawal Agreement three 
times.  
264 Initially, the transition period was expected to come into effect after the UK officially exited 
the EU on 29 March 2019 and to last until the end of 2020. As the Withdrawal Agreement was 
not ratified by the UK Parliament, Brexit was delayed and two further extensions were granted 
by the EU to the UK to come up with alternative arrangements, the latest one expiring on 31 
October 2019.  
265 Under certain circumstances, the CJEU is expected to continue to have jurisdiction after the 
transition period though the provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement are not very clear on this 
point.  
266 Withdrawal Agreement (n 262), Annex 4, art 2(a). 
267 Ibid art 2(b). 
268 Ibid art 3. 
269 Ibid art 1. 
270 See General Secretariat of the Council, Political Declaration Setting Out the Framework for 
the Future Relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom (Report, doc 
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expected to promote good governance in tax matters, improve international 
cooperation in the tax area and facilitate the collection of tax revenues. This is 
likely to substantially curb the power of the UK to engage in aggressive tax 
competition, should it choose to do so in the post-Brexit era. In fact, the UK 
might not even be able to engage in any form of tax competition that focuses 
on attracting investment through the selective conferral of tax incentives to 
certain industries or undertakings. This is because the Withdrawal Agreement 
includes commitments by the UK to be subject to the joint surveillance powers 
of DG COMP and the UK Competition Authority to ensure consistency on state 
aid matters.271  
These commitments have been criticised as locking in the UK for an indefinite 
term and limiting its post-Brexit policy options, including its corporate tax 
policy options.272 It is not surprising that, at the time of writing, the UK 
Parliament has overwhelmingly rejected the Withdrawal Agreement three times 
and an extension period for departing from the EU was eventually given by the 
EU at the UK’s request. This extension period will end on 31 October 2019. No 
one quite knows what is going to happen after the period has elapsed and 
whether there will be a soft Brexit (that is, with a deal) or a hard Brexit (that is, 
without a deal). Following the resignation of the UK Prime Minister Theresa 
May after the European Parliament Elections in May 2019, the governing 
Conservative Party elected Boris Johnson as the new Prime Minister on 23 July 
2019. Johnson was the leading advocate of the Leave campaign and has 
advocated a no-deal Brexit in case the EU does not renegotiate its Withdrawal 
Agreement. However, the EU has reiterated that there will be no further 
renegotiation of the Withdrawal Agreement.273 Whilst the UK seems to be 
marching towards a hard Brexit, it would seem that very minimal preparations 
                                                 
XT 21095/18, Council of the European Union, 22 November 2012) Part II, XIV [79] 
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37059/20181121-cover-political-declaration.pdf>.   
271 It had already been announced at an earlier stage of the negotiation process that the UK would 
maintain a rigorous state aid control system, even in the no-deal scenario, and that the UK 
Competition authority would take on the role of enforcement and supervision for the whole of 
the UK. See the guidance published by the UK Government on 23 August 2018 to inform 
citizens and business how state aid rules would apply in the event of a no-deal Brexit: 
‘Guidance: State Aid if There's No Brexit Deal’ Gov.UK (Web Page, 23 August 2018) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/state-aid-if-theres-no-brexit-deal>.  
272 This is one of the main reasons why the draft Withdrawal Agreement was rejected three times 
by the UK Parliament. The Irish backstop was also a major source of concern. For a general 
overview, see Tom Edgington, ‘Brexit: What Deal Did MPs Reject?’, BBC News (online, 29 
March 2019) <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-47745831>.  
273 See one of the many reports available at: Jon Stone, ‘EU Leaders ‘Unanimous There Will Be 
No Renegotiation of Brexit Deal, Says Juncker’, Independent (online, 21 June 2019) 
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-news-latest-theresa-may-no-deal-eu-
exit-a8968756.html>.  
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have been made for it, at least in the tax field.274 From a corporate tax 
perspective, if the UK leaves without a deal, then it will be treated as a third 
country and UK investors stand to lose the protection of the fundamental 
freedoms and EU secondary legislation, although they will still benefit from the 
free movement of capital. 
In any case, the EU should not bask in the illusion of success as far as the Brexit 
negotiations on taxation are concerned (with or without a deal), for the EU 
system of corporate tax law is deeply flawed and in urgent need of some 
cohesion and coordination. As already explained, the current system is a 
patchwork of sometimes contradictory rules and ad hoc solutions, often 
combined with lack of institutional accountability or transparency.  
Ironically, Brexit might prove to be a catalyst for more extensive harmonisation 
in the EU legal order, at least as far as corporate tax policy is concerned. To a 
large extent, it is the lack of further harmonisation which has led to the often 
uncoordinated results and historical compromises that we have today. On a 
political level, the UK has long been considered as one of the more recalcitrant 
Member States,275 though, admittedly, not the only one averse to further tax 
harmonisation. The UK’s stance against the European Commission’s proposals 
for the FTT and, less emphatically, the CCCTB is indicative of this 
recalcitrance. Whatever the final withdrawal deal, if any, the vacuum to be left 
by the departure of the UK from the EU is unlikely to be filled in the immediate 
future by any other Member State with the same predisposition against further 
tax integration and the economic power to back it up. In any case, even before 
Brexit, the dynamics in the international tax system had already — some would 
                                                 
274 See, eg, ‘Guidance: Check Temporary Rates of Customs Duty (Tariffs) on Imports after EU 
Exit’ GOV.UK (Web Page, 13 March 2019) <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/check-temporary-
rates-of-customs-duty-on-imports-after-eu-exit>. As far as the EU’s position is concerned, see 
the recent Commission Communication of 12 June 2019: ‘State of Play of Preparations of 
Contingency Measures for the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union 
— Includes Annex 1 and Annex 2’ COM(2019) 276 final <https://ec.europa.eu/ 
info/publications/communication-12-june-2019-state-play-preparations-contingency-
measures-withdrawal-united-kingdom-european-union_en>. 
275 See Klaas Staal’s LSE blog which shows how Britain has most often taken positions against 
the majority in the Council of the European Union: Klaas Staal, Britain Has Most Often Taken 
Positions against the Majority in the Council of the European Union (Blog, 10 November 2017) 
<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/11/10/britain-has-most-often-taken-positions-against-the-
majority-in-the-council-of-the-european-union/>. This is based on a paper authored jointly with 
Marco Fantini, where a Member State’s influence on decision‐making in the Council was 
assessed on the basis of the voting behaviour of other countries. UK had less support than all 
other Member States. See Marco Fantini and Klaas Staal, ‘Influence in the EU: Measuring 
Mutual Support’ (2018) 56(2) Journal of Common Market Studies 212, 216 <https:// 
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.12586>.  
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say irrevocably — changed and the polemic against base erosion and profit 
shifting simply facilitated further tax integration in the EU. In other words, the 
process for further corporate tax harmonisation may have already started, with 
or without the UK’s input and involvement. It is hoped that this process will 
help resolve the problematic issues discussed in this article and address the 
peripatetic nature of EU corporate tax law. Whether the UK is about to embark 
on its own peripatetic adventure as far as its corporate tax system is concerned, 
that remains to be seen.  
